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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:
:

v.

:

JOSEPH P. TUNZI,

:

Case No. 20010676-SC

:

Priority No. 13

Defendant/Respondent.

JURISDICTION
This Court granted the state's petition for writ of certiorari. This Court therefore
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2001).
OPINION BELOW
State v. TunzL 2001 UT App 224, 31 P.3d 588 (" Tunzi") is in Addendum A.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON CERTIORARI AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue. Respondent/Defendant Joseph P. Tunzi ("Joseph11 or "Respondent'1) was
bound over from juvenile court to district court on the charge of attempted homicide
pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act. A jury acquitted Joseph of attempted
homicide but convicted him of a lesser offense which is not a Serious Youth Offender
offense. Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the district court lost
jurisdiction when Joseph was acquitted of the serious offense which provided the basis
for the bindover and convicted of a lesser, non-serious youth offender offense?

Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the conclusion of the Court
of Appeals for correctness. State v. Layman. 1999 UT 79, ^[3, 985 P.2d 911 (further
citation omitted). This issue involves a question of statutory interpretation and therefore
the standard of review employed by the Court of Appeals was a review for correctness.
See Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, f7 (citing Adkins v. Uncle Bart's Inc.. 2000 UT 14, Tfl 1,
1 P. 3d 528).

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996) is determinative of the issue on certiorari.
The text of that statute is in Addendum B. The texts of the recent amendment to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 , the direct file statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601 (1996) and
the certification statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 (1996), are also in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state filed an Information dated November 5, 1998 in juvenile court, charging
Joseph with attempted criminal homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 & 76-4-101 (1999). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602
(1996), the juvenile court bound Joseph over to district court for trial. R. 11-12.
A jury trial was held on April 22-23, 1999. R. 76-7. Although the elements of
aggravated assault were not necessarily included in the charge of attempted homicide, the
state requested and received an instruction for that offense. R. 64, 73, 98. The jury
acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide, the charge which had provided the basis for the

2

bindover, and convicted him of aggravated assault. R. 77, 108. Because the aggravated
assault elements instruction contained elements for both the third and second degree
felony versions of aggravated assault, the trial judge entered judgment for the third
degree felony and sentenced Joseph to serve zero to five years at the Utah State Prison.1
R. 117-19. Prior to sentencing, Joseph moved to transfer the case back to juvenile court
because the jury had acquitted him of the Serious Youth Offender charge which provided
the basis for the bindover and convicted him of a charge which is not a Serious Youth
Offender offense. R. 222:5-8. The trial court denied the motion. R. 222:11.2
Joseph directly appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals, and moved
for summary reversal when it was discovered that the videotape and transcript of one day
of the two-day trial were missing. R. 136, 141:194. The Court of Appeals denied that
motion and remanded the case to the trial court for reconstruction of the record. On
certiorari, this Court summarily reversed that decision and remanded the case for a new
trial. State v. TunzL 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816 (" Tunzi l") is in Addendum C.

1

The instruction for aggravated assault contained alternative elements for both the
second and third degree felony versions of that crime. R. 96. The second degree felony
version requires serious bodily injury whereas the third degree felony version requires
use of a dangerous weapon. Because of the ambiguous verdict, Joseph argued and the
state agreed that he must be convicted of the lesser third degree felony. R. 142:2-4.
Based on defendant's motion, the state's stipulation and good cause, the judge ordered
that Joseph be sentenced for third degree felony aggravated assault.
2

Second degree felony aggravated assault, causing serious bodily injury, is a
Serious Youth Offender offense, whereas third degree felony aggravated assault, using a
deadly weapon, is not a Serious Youth Offender offense.
3

On remand, the state attempted to proceed with a second degree felony charge of
aggravated assault even though Joseph had been convicted of only a third degree felony
in the original proceedings. R. 158-75. The state subsequently offered Joseph, who was
in the custody of the Utah State Prison or Salt Lake County jail throughout the
proceedings, a plea bargain whereby Joseph would plead guilty to a third degree felony
and be given credit for time served and released. R. 223:2-5. Joseph ultimately accepted
the plea bargain and pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, a third degree felony; the trial
judge gave Joseph credit for time served and he was released. R. 223:9-10. Joseph
appealed his conviction for the sole purpose of returning this case to juvenile court.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to remand
the case to the juvenile court after Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide and
convicted of a non-Serious Youth Offender offense. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^[1, 13
("Upon the finding of not guilty of attempted murder and the court's decision to grant
Tunzi's motion to enter a conviction of third degree felony aggravated assault, the
juvenile court regained jurisdiction over Tunzi.... Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court erred when it denied Tunzi's motion to transfer jurisdiction back to the
juvenile court prior to entry of his conviction.1'). The Court of Appeals nvacate[d]
Tunzi's conviction and remand[ed] to the district court with instructions to transfer the
case to the juvenile court for entry of an adjudication of guilt for third degree felony
aggravated assault." Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^[19.

4

The state filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While the facts of the underlying incident are not pertinent to the issue on appeal,
they provide background. On Halloween night, 1998, a fight occurred in which Rocky
Vigil was stabbed. R. 141. The factual issue at trial was whether Joseph or his cousin,
Zeb Smith, stabbed Rocky. R. 141. None of the witnesses on the first day of trial
testified that Joseph was the person who stabbed Rocky; some of the witnesses did,
however, implicate Zeb as the stabber. See e ^ R . 141:101, 103-05, 111, 128-29. Zeb
was originally suspected of being the stabber and made inconsistent statements to
officers regarding statements Joseph had allegedly made. R. 58-9, 81.
Zeb Smith testified against Joseph on the second day of trial. R. 77. Since a
transcript of the second day of trial does not exist, the details of Zeb's testimony are
unknown.
Rocky suffered extensive injuries as the result of the stabbing, as outlined in the
state's brief ("S.B.") at 5. The state fails to acknowledge, however, that despite these
extensive injuries, the jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide. See S.B. at 5, 10.
This acquittal in the face of such extensive injuries suggests that the jury found that
Joseph was not the stabber. In light of the testimony at the trial implicating Zeb as the
stabber, additional testimony that Joseph had a knife in his possession (R. 141:139) and
the jury's acquittal of Joseph on the attempted homicide charge, it appears likely that the

5

jury convicted Joseph for aggravated assault based on the use of a dangerous weapon,
but did not find that Joseph inflicted the extensive injuries which Rocky sustained.
Moreover, the conviction in this case is based on the use of a dangerous weapon rather
than the infliction of serious bodily injury. R. 204-05.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the Serious Youth Offender Act
("the Act") required that this case be remanded to juvenile court when Joseph was
acquitted of attempted homicide. The plain language of the Act required this conclusion
since attempted homicide was the only charge in this case and Joseph was acquitted of
that charge.
The remainder of the Act supports the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this case
should be remanded to the juvenile court. The term "charges" is used throughout the
Act, with only one exception, to refer to the Serious Youth Offender offense which
provided the basis for transfer to district court. Additionally, subsection (7) indicates that
in order to qualify as a "charge," the charge must be set forth in the information and the
juvenile judge must find that there is probable cause to support the charge. In this case,
attempted homicide was the only charge which fit these requirements. Moreover,
aggravated assault was not necessarily included in the charge of attempted homicide.
Because there are additional elements in aggravated assault, the juvenile judge did not
implicitly find probable cause to bind Joseph over on aggravated assault, and aggravated

6

assault therefore cannot be a "charge" under subsections (7) and (10).
The purpose for which the Act was adopted also supports the Court of Appeals'
conclusion. The Legislature intended that violent juveniles who commit serious offenses
be transferred to the adult system and suffer adult consequences. When the juvenile is
acquitted of the serious offense, the reasons for the bindover no longer exist.
Reading the Act in harmony with the direct file and certification statutes also
supports the Court of Appeals' decision. The direct file and certification statutes contain
language which is distinct from that of the Act. The distinctions between the language in
the certification and direct file statutes and the language of the Act demonstrate further
that the Act required remand to the juvenile court.
The state has not offered any basis for departingfromthe plain language of the
Act and accepted rules of statutory construction. Instead of analyzing the Act pursuant to
the rules of statutory construction, the state complains that the procedure outlined by the
Act and embraced by the Court of Appeals is unworkable and has been rejected by every
other state to consider it. The state also claims the amendment to the Act passed after
this case was on certiorari applies retroactively to this case. These arguments fail.
The procedure required by the Act and upheld by the Court of Appeals provides a
fair and practicable approach. Contrary to the state's assumption, a district court trying a
Serious Youth Offender case could and must give lesser instructions where appropriate.
If a juvenile is acquitted by a jury or pleads to a lesser offense, the case can be remanded
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at that point prior to sentencing. A juvenile judge who does not preside over a trial
nevertheless is able to making sentencing decisions and decisions on any motion for new
trial.
The state is incorrect when it claims all other states which have considered this
procedure have rejected it. A number of states utilize a similar procedure, reasoning that
remand is required when the juvenile is convicted of a lesser offense because (1) the
juvenile committed a delinquency rather than a crime and is not criminally responsible
for the lesser offense; (2) the policies of the juvenile system are furthered when a case is
remanded after the juvenile is acquitted of the offense which provided the basis for the
transfer; and (3) fairness requires that a juvenile convicted of a lesser crime be treated the
same as all other juveniles who are adjudicated guilty of the same offense.
The recent amendment to subsection (10) of the Act does not apply to this case.
Retroactive application of the amendment violates Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000) and
the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE JUVENILE COURT REGAINED JURISDICTION WHEN
JOSEPH WAS ACQUITTED OF THE SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER
CHARGE WHICH PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR THE BINDOVER.
The Serious Youth Offender Act5 Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996), allows the
juvenile court to transfer a juvenile sixteen years or older to district court for trial on
certain specified violent felony charges. The Act designates nine serious, violent
8

felonies which can be tried in district court if the juvenile court finds probable cause to
believe the juvenile committed the crime and the juvenile court finds further that the
juvenile does not meet all three of the retention factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 783a-602(3)(b). Because one of the retention factors requires a finding "that the minor's
role in the offense was not committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner11
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(b)(iii)), the vast majority of juveniles are not able to
meet the retention factors since the felonies listed in subsection (1) are by their very
nature violent, aggressive, or premeditated. The essential basis for transferring a case to
district court under the Act is therefore the charge that the juvenile committed a serious
and violent felony.
The version of subsection (10) of the Act in effect at the time of the crime, trial
and Court of Appeals' decision3, required that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction if
there was an acquittal or dismissal of the charges. It states, ,f[t]he juvenile court under
Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any
authority previously exercised over the juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of
not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court.11 The Court of Appeals
correctly concluded that subsections (3)(b) and (10) of the Act f,define[] the jurisdictional

3

Subsection (10) of the Act was amended by the Legislature earlier this year.
Respondent refers to the version of subsection (10) in effect when he was tried
throughout this brief and refers to the recent change as the amendment. Application of
the amendment to this case would violate Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000) and the state
and federal prohibitions against ex post facto laws. See discussion infra at 36-50.
9

parameters of both the juvenile court and the district court in those instances when a
minor is charged with one of the offenses listed in section 78-3a-602(l)(a)." Tunzi, 2001
UT App 224, f 10. Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that subsection
(10) required that the juvenile court regained jurisdiction "[u]pon the finding of not
guilty of attempted murder and the court's decision to grant Tunzi's motion to enter a
conviction of third degree felony aggravated assault." Tunzi. 2001 UT App 224, ^13.
A. The Court of Appeals Correctly Concluded that Subsection (10)
Required that the Case Be Remanded to the Juvenile Court.
The language of subsection (10) required that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction
when there was an acquittal or dismissal "of the charges in district court." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) (1996). The Court of Appeals held that the "charges" referred to
in subsection (10) are the Serious Youth Offender charges enumerated in section 78-3a602(1) which provide the basis for a transfer to district court. Tunzi. 2001 UT App 224,
^[13 ("Upon the finding of not guilty of attempted murder and the court's decision to
grant Tunzi's motion to enter a conviction of third degree felony aggravated assault, the
juvenile court regained jurisdiction over Tunzi because there was 4a finding of not guilty
[and] dismissal of the charges [enumerated in section 78-3a-602(l) and allowing bindover to] district court.'" (brackets in original)). This conclusion that the "charges"
referred to in subsection (10) are the Serious Youth Offender charges enumerated in
subsection (1) is consistent with the plain language of subsection (10), the remainder of
the Act, legislative history, the purpose for which the Act was enacted, and a comparison
10

of the language of the Act with the language of the certification and direct file statutes.
The plain language of subsection (10) required that the juvenile court regain
jurisdiction if the there was an acquittal or a dismissal of the "charges." Statutes found in
Chapter 3 a of Title 78, including the Serious Youth Offender Act, "are not part of the
criminal code, but are part of the Juvenile Courts Act; they "were promulgated with
juvenile procedures and issues in mind and were meant to apply to the juvenile context."
State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33, ^17, 24 P.3d 936. Since the Act discusses proceedings in
juvenile court, the term "charges" in subsection (10) necessarily refers to charges which
are outlined in the information filed in juvenile court and which provide the basis for the
bindover. In this case, the only "charge" in the information filed in district court was
attempted murder. When Joseph was acquitted of that charge, the plain language of
subsection (10) required that this case be remanded to the juvenile court. See State in the
Interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (where the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, the statute will ordinarily be interpreted pursuant to its
plain language).
While the plain language of subsection (10) required that the case be remanded to
the juvenile court when Joseph was acquitted of the only "charge" in the information,
resort to rules of statutory construction beyond the plain language likewise establishes
that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the juvenile court regained jurisdiction
when Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide. ."[I]f there is doubt or uncertainty as

11

to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the
act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance
with its intent and purpose." State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(citations and quotations omitted). In addition, when a statute is ambiguous, "'resort to
legislative history and purpose for guidance"1 is appropriate. State in the interest of
A.B.. 936 P.2d at 1097 (citing State v. Valdez. 933 P. 2d 400, 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1997))
(further citation omitted). Moreover, the Act must be read in harmony with related
statutes, "in this case, Utah's two other statutes for prosecuting youthful offenders."
State in the interest of A.B., 936 P.2d at 1097 (citation omitted).
When the Act is read in its entirety, it is apparent that the "charges" referred to in
subsection (10) are the charges which provided the basis for the bindover, and subsection
(10) therefore required that a case be remanded to the juvenile court when the juvenile
was acquitted of the serious offense which provided the basis for the transfer to district
court. The focus throughout the Act is on the charges enumerated in subsection (1)
which provide the basis for the transfer to district court. The Act enumerates the charges
which qualify for Serious Youth Offender treatment, then discusses the procedure to be
utilized for determining whether the case will be transferred to district court based on the
filing of the charges enumerated in subsection (1). In fact, all but one of the ten
subsections of the Act pertain solely to the charges filed in the information which may
provide a basis for transfer to district court. Hence, when the Act is read as a whole, it is
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apparent that the "charges" referred to in subsection (10) are the charges outlined in
subsection (1) which provide the basis for transfer to district court.
The term "charges" is used in the Act for the most part to refer to the charges
which provide the basis for the bindover to district court. For example, subsection (2)
uses the term "charges" to refer to the charges in subsection (1). It states, "[a]ll
proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under subsection (1) shall
be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (2) (emphasis added).
Subsection (7) also uses the term "charges" to refer primarily to the charges
enumerated in subsection (1) which provide the basis for the transfer to district court.
Subsection (7) states:
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the
same information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district
court for one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising
from the same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or
felonies charged against him shall be considered together with those
charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those
crimes have been committed and that the defendant committed them, the
defendant shall also be bound over to district court to answer for those
charges.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7) (1996). This subsection uses the term "charges" to twice
refer to the charges enumerated in subsection (1) which provided the basis for the
transfer to district court. While subsection (7) also uses the term "charges" to once refer
to charges which are tacked on after a case is bound over pursuant to the Act, it uses the
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term "charges" primarily to refer to the charges which provide the basis for the transfer to
district court. The single use of the term "charges" in subsection (7) to refer to
something other than the charges which provide the basis for the bindover does not
override the multiple use of that term to refer to the charges which provide the basis for
the transfer or the focus of the Act in general on the charges which provide the basis for
the transfer.
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that subsection (7) does not change the
meaning of the term "charges" to include charges other than those which provide the
basis for the transfer to district court. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^14-16. The Court of
Appeals dispensed with the state's claim that all offenses must be dismissed, not just
those that provide the basis for the bindover, by pointing out that subsection (7) requires
that offenses be charged in an information and the juvenile court must find probable
cause in order for those charges to be tacked on and treated as subsection (7) offenses.
Id., ^f 15-16. Because the state charged Joseph with only attempted murder and no other
offenses were included in an information or brought before the juvenile court judge for a
probable cause finding, the Court of Appeals recognized that no offense other than
attempted murder could be considered a "charge" under the Act. In other words, since
the state did not request the lesser until district court, the only "charge" which was
considered in the juvenile court and which therefore could qualify as a charge under the
Act was attempted homicide. The Court of Appeals stated:
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While subsection 7 allows the district court to exercise jurisdiction
over other offenses arising out of (and after) the violent felony enumerated
in section 78-3a-602(l) and allowing bind-over, the plain language of
subsection 7 requires that these offenses be charged in the same
information [citation omitted]. In addition, subsection 7 requires the
juvenile court to "find [] probable cause to believe that those crimes have
M
been committed and that the defendant committed them
[Citation
omitted.]
Here, the State charged Tunzi in the same information with the
single offense of attempted murder. The State did not charge Tunzi with
"multiple criminal offenses in the same information[,]" and the juvenile
court's bind-over did not necessarily include a finding of "probable cause
to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the defendant
committed them . . . . " [Citation omitted.] Consequently, the third degree
felony aggravated assault was not an "other offense" under subsection 7,
and the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter a conviction
therefore. [Citation omitted.]
Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^[15-16 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7) (1996)).
Because attempted homicide is the only charge listed in the information or on which
Joseph was bound over to district court, subsection (10) required that the case be
transferred back to the juvenile court when Joseph was acquitted of that charge.
The Court of Appeals alternatively dispensed with the state's claim that the district
court retained jurisdiction because Joseph was convicted of a lesser included offense by
pointing out that aggravated assault was not necessarily included in the charge of
attempted homicide. Because the elements of aggravated assault were not necessarily
included in the charge of attempted murder, aggravated assault could not be considered a
charge under the Act.
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Further, even if it is assumed that the information effectively charges
lesser included offenses prior to the requested instructions on such
offenses, the included offenses at that point can be only those "whose
statutory elements are necessarily included within the statutory elements of
the charge offense." State v. Carruth. 1999 UT 107, ^fl3, 993 P.2d 869
(emphasis added). The elements of aggravated assault are not necessarily
included within the statutory elements of attempted murder. Compare Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1996) (listing elements of criminal homicide) with
id. § 76-5-103 (listing elements of aggravated assault including elements of
intentionally causing serious bodily injury to another or using a dangerous
weapon or other means of force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury). Therefore, the information charging Tunzi with attempted murder
did not include the charge of aggravated assault at the time of the bindover.
Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^|17. As the Court of Appeals recognized, aggravated assault
could not be a "charge" under subsection (7) because it contains elements which are not
contained in attempted homicide and therefore the juvenile court judge did not implicitly
find probable cause to bind Joseph over on aggravated assault and the charge of
aggravated assault was not contained in the information.
A comparison of the elements of attempted homicide with the elements for the
two forms of aggravated assault establishes that aggravated assault is not necessarily
included in attempted homicide. See State v. Finlavson. 2000 UT 10, fl6, 994 P.2d
1243 (statutory elements of a crime control whether a crime is an included offense). The
elements of attempted murder, the crime for which Joseph was charged and bound over,
are an attempt to knowingly or intentionally cause the death of another. R. 95; Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-20 l(l)(a) (1999). The elements of the two versions of aggravated
assault submitted to the jury were a knowing or intentional assault which caused serious
16

bodily injury or was accomplished by the use of a dangerous weapon or other means of
force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. R. 96; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103
(1999). Because an attempt to commit a homicide does not require causing serious
bodily injury or using a dangerous weapon or the requisite force, the aggravated assault
charges contain elements which are not necessarily included in the charge of attempted
murder. The juvenile court's bindover on attempted murder therefore did not necessarily
include a finding of probable cause to believe Joseph used a weapon or caused serious
bodily injury.4 Aggravated assault could not therefore be a "charge" under subsection
(10) because it does not qualify as a subsequent "charge" under subsection 7.
The original legislative history and the purpose for which the Act was adopted
also demonstrate that subsection (10) was intended to require that a case be remanded to
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The district court improperly instructed the jury, at the state's request, on the
assault charges. See State v. Carruth, 1999 UT 107,1ffil5-l8, 993 P.2d 869 (elements of
lesser charge requested by the state must be completely contained in the charged
offense); State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 869 (Utah 1998) (same). In the context of
a Serious Youth Offender case, where the state has succeeded in transferring a juvenile
to district court based on the serious nature of the charges, allowing the state to proceed
on lesser charges after the bindover raises questions as to the propriety of the transfer.
Allowing the state leeway in requesting lesser instructions after a case is bound over
solely on the more serious charge undercuts the purpose of the Act in that it allows the
state to overcharge a case in juvenile court, then proceed in district court on the lesser
charge which the evidence actually supports, thereby transferring cases to district court
under the Act even though the crime was not one of the violent felonies listed in the Act.
If this Court were to embrace the state's argument and preclude remand to the district
court when defendants are convicted of lessers, prosecutors will be encouraged to
overcharge their cases in order to establish an easy route to adult court in cases which do
not otherwise qualify for district court treatment.
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juvenile court when the juvenile is acquitted of the serious offense which provided the
basis for transferring the case to district court. See. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 24, f 18 ("it
would be unjust and contrary to a minor's best interest to require a minor to 'answer in
district court in the same manner as an adult' when the minor has not been convicted of
any of the violent felonies enumerated in the Serious Youth Offender Act1'). The
legislative purpose for enacting the Act was to require that juveniles 16 and 17 years old
who commit violent and aggressive offenses, making them as dangerous as adult
criminals, be dealt with in the adult system. State in the interest of A.B., 936 P.2d at
1098-99. The Legislature intended that violent and aggressive 16 and 17 year olds, most
of whom would eventually end up in the adult system, be removed from the juvenile
system when they commit one of the nine "very serious aggravated offenses" identified
by the Legislature as being so violent and aggressive that transfer to the adult system is
warranted. IcL; see also Utah House and Senate Floor Debates, 51st Legislature, General
Session (February 9, 1995 and March 1, 1995) at 3, 11, 14, attached as Addendum D.
The Legislature's focus in passing the Act was on holding hardened, seriously
violent juvenile offenders accountable in the adult system. IdL at 3, 4, 14. The
Legislature recognized that mechanisms existed in the adult system that should, in
appropriate cases, keep youths who commit such serious offenses from going to prison or
otherwise being treated too harshly in the adult system. IdL at 4. In addition, the
Legislature included subsection (10) which mandated that the juvenile court regained
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jurisdiction if the youth was acquitted of the charges or the charges were dismissed.
When subsection (10) is read in light of the legislative purpose, it is evident that
subsection (10) required that the case be remanded to the juvenile court when there was
not a conviction for the serious, violent offense which was the basis for the transfer to
adult court.
Reading the Serious Youth Offender Act in harmony with the direct file and
certification statutes further supports the Court of Appeals' holding that subsection (10)
required remand to the juvenile court in this case. See. State in the interest of A.B., 936
P.2d at 1097 (reading the Serious Youth Offender Act in harmony with the direct file and
certification statutes). Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601, the direct file statute, mandates that
the district court has original jurisdiction over juveniles 16 and older when the juvenile is
charged with murder or aggravated murder, or if the juvenile was previously committed
to a secure facility. There is no provision in the direct file statute for remand to juvenile
court if the juvenile is acquitted or the direct file charges are dismissed. The lack of
language requiring remand to the juvenile court in the direct file statute, in contrast to the
language of subsection (10) indicates that when a case is directly filed it stays in district
court regardless of the outcome. By contrast, the inclusion language requiring remand in
subsection (10) of the Act signals an intent to return a case to juvenile court when the
basis for the transfer—commission of one of the nine violent crimes specified by the
Legislature—is not proved.
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The differences between the certification statute and the Serious Youth Offender
Act likewise demonstrate that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that subsection
(10) required that the case be remanded. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 provides for
certification of juveniles to district court when the juvenile judge finds that certification
is appropriate based on one or more factors set forth in the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 783a-603 contains a subsection with language almost identical to that of subsection (10) of
the Act, which provides that the juvenile court regains jurisdiction "when there is an
acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court.11 Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(14). The certification statute, however, contains an additional
provision which states, f,[a] minor may be convicted under this section on the charges
filed or on any other offenses arising out of the same criminal episode." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-603(13). The inclusion in the certification statute of language indicating that the
case remains in district court even if the juvenile is convicted of an offense other than the
offense charged demonstrates that the Legislature was capable of drafting language that
would require a case to stay in district court even if the minor was not convicted of the
charged offense, and would include such language if that were its intent. The inclusion
of such language in the certification statute and by contrast, its absence in the Serious
Youth Offender Act, demonstrates that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the
Act required remand when Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide and convicted of
a non-Serious Youth Offender offense.
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The Legislature's choice of more expansive language in the certification statute
furthers the purposes served by the certification statute. In deciding whether to certify a
juvenile to district court, the juvenile court considers a number of factors, including the
likelihood of rehabilitation. State in the interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d at 1098; Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-603(3). The seriousness of the offense, while one of the factors to be
considered in the certification context, does not have the overriding influence that it does
in the Serious Youth Offender context. In fact, the juvenile court considers the nature of
the juvenile at least as much as it does the nature of the crime when it decides to certify a
case for district court treatment. After a juvenile court has considered the relevant
factors and concluded that the juvenile should be certified, conviction on a lesser offense
arising out of the same episode does not disturb the rationale for the original
certification. By contrast, when a minor is charged with a Serious Youth Offender
offense, the rationale for transferring the case to district court is destroyed when the
minor is acquitted of the serious crime which provided the basis for the bindover or that
charge is dismissed.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) mandated that the juvenile court regained
jurisdiction when a juvenile was acquitted of the serious offense which provided the
basis for the transfer to district court. The Court of Appeals' holding was consistent with
the plain language of the Act, the Act when it is read in its entirety, related statutes for
prosecuting youthful offenders, and the purpose for which the Act was passed. In this
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case, Joseph was charged only with attempted homicide and bound over to district court
solely on that charge. R. 9, 11-12; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(l)(a)(ix). Joseph
was acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for transfer to district court and
convicted of a non-Serious Youth Offender charge. R. 109, 108. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals correctly concluded that the case should be remanded to the juvenile court.
B. The State Has Not Offered Any Basis for Departing from Accepted
Rules of Statutory Construction.
Rather than analyzing the Act based on accepted rules of statutory construction,
the state glosses over the language of the Act and instead asks this Court to overturn the
Court of Appeals because (1) requiring remand creates an unworkable system which has
been rejected by other states with different statutory schemes, and (2) the Legislature
amended subsection (10) in response to the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, and
that amendment and the comments made by legislators in amending the statute change
the analysis of the original provision. Neither argument provides a persuasive basis for
ignoring the language of the relevant version of the Act.
(1) Remanding to the Juvenile Court When There Is an Acquittal or
Dismissal of the Charges Which Provided the Basis for the Transfer Is a
Fair and Practicable Procedure Which Is Mandated by the Language of
the Act and Which Is Utilized by a Number of Jurisdictions.
The Act explicitly outlines the cases which can be transferred to district court. It
also contained explicit language in subsection (10) mandating that the juvenile court
regained jurisdiction if there was an acquittal or a dismissal of the charges. The language
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of the Act, not the decisions of other courts interpreting distinct statutory schemes or the
state's concern that the approach is impractical, controls the determination of whether the
Serious Youth Offender Act required that this case be remanded to juvenile court when
Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide and convicted of aggravated assault.
Additionally, even if this Court were to consider the state's argument that the procedure
affirmed by the Court of Appeals is unworkable and has been rejected by all other
jurisdictions, such argument is incorrect.
According to the state, requiring remand when there is an acquittal is unworkable
because the district court would not be able to instruct on lesser offenses, and even if the
district court did instruct on lessers, practical problems would arise as to when the case
would be remanded and the juvenile court judge would be left to hear motions for a new
trial and conduct sentencings in cases over which s/he did not preside. S.B. at 11-12.
Neither of these concerns raised by the state withstands scrutiny. Moreover, based on
convincing rationales, a number of states have embraced a similar procedure when a
juvenile is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for adult court jurisdiction
and convicted of a lesser charge.
(a) The District Court Is Not Precluded from Instructing on Lesser
Offenses Where Appropriate.
The state argues that a district court judge would not be able to give lesser offense
instructions in Serious Youth Offender cases if the Court of Appeals' decision is upheld.
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S.B. at 11. This argument fails because (1) it incorrectly assumes that lack of jurisdiction
to sentence a juvenile or enter judgment of conviction on non-Serious Youth Offender
charges means that the trial court also cannot instruct the jury or accept pleas on lesser
offenses, and (2) it ignores the fact that due process requires a lesser included instruction
must be given under certain circumstances when requested by the defendant.
While section 78-3a-602(10) specified that the juvenile court regained jurisdiction
if the juvenile was acquitted of the charges, it did not preclude the district court from
giving an instruction on a lesser charge where appropriate. Subsection (10) required
remand only after acquittal or dismissal of the charges; subsection (10) did not say that a
trial court did not have the authority to fairly oversee the case by submitting a lesser
offense instruction or accepting a plea to a lesser offense. In cases from other
jurisdictions holding that the matter must be remanded to the juvenile court because the
juvenile was acquitted of the offense which provided the basis for transfer to adult court
or that charge was dismissed, the adult court nevertheless had jurisdiction to submit
lesser included offense instructions or to accept a guilt plea to a lesser offense. See e.g.
State v. Bedford, 190 So. 347, 350-51 (La. 1939) (judge can instruct on lesser offenses
even though case will be transferred to juvenile court if minor is convicted of lesser);
People v. Station. 156 Misc.2d 778, 780-81, 594 N.Y.S.2d 580, 582 (1992) (adult court
can accept plea to lesser crime; case must then be transferred to juvenile court).
The state bases its argument that the district court could not give instructions on
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lesser offenses if the Court of Appeals' decision is upheld on State v. Morales . 694 A.2d
758 (Conn. 1997) and People v. Murch. 263 N.Y. 285, 189 N.E. 220 (N.Y. 1934). S.B.
at 11-12. Neither case provides guidance in interpreting Utah's statutory scheme not
only because each case deals with different statutory language, but also because they are
not well reasoned and reach incorrect conclusions.
For example, in dictum in Morales, the Court assumed that if it were to hold that a
juvenile charged in adult court with murder must be transferred to the juvenile court if
convicted of manslaughter, it would also be required to depart from the "well established
rules pertaining to lesser included offenses." Morales., 694 A.2d at 762. According to
the Connecticut court, the jury could never deliberate on lessers because in that
jurisdiction, the jury is always instructed "that it may not begin to deliberate regarding
any lesser included offense until it has concluded that the defendant is not guilty of the
greater offense." IcL (citation omitted). According to the court, if it were to hold that the
case must be transferred to juvenile court if the juvenile is acquitted of the charged
offense, it would lose jurisdiction the moment the jury found that the defendant was not
guilty of the charge which provided the basis for the transfer. IcL
Under Utah's statutory scheme, however, juries are not instructed that they must
acquit before considering any lesser offenses. See_ State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 28385 (Utah 1989) (jury need not acquit defendant of greater offense before considering
lesser) (citing People v. Mays, 288 N.W.2d 207, 208 (Mich. 1980) (instruction is

25

erroneous if it conveys the impression that the jury must acquit the defendant of the
greater offense before considering the lesser)); see. also Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 869
(citing State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994)). Because juries in Utah need
not acquit a defendant of the greater offense before considering the lesser, the dictum in
Morales does not apply.
Additionally, the dictum in Morales is not persuasive since it disregards the due
process requirement that juries must be instructed regarding appropriate lesser offenses.
See Beck v.Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); State v.Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah
1984). Regardless of whether the district court has jurisdiction to sentence a juvenile on
a lesser charge, due process requires that the jury be instructed on lessers. Id.
The decision in Murch, also relied on by the state for its assumption that the
district court could not instruct the jury on a lesser offense if the Court of Appeals'
decision is upheld, likewise does not provide persuasive guidance. In Murch , the court
held that the trial judge properly refused to give a lesser offense instruction of
manslaughter which was requested by the defendant. Murch . 263 N.Y. at 290.
According to the court, the trial judge properly refused the lesser offense instruction
because the adult court had jurisdiction over the fifteen year old defendant on only the
charges of murder in the first or second degree. IdL. at 290. In concluding that the adult
court need not give a lesser instruction on manslaughter, the Murch court rejected the
defendant's argument that refusing the lesser instruction deprived him of a substantial
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right. Id at 290.
The reasoning of the court in Murch flies in the face of Beck. 447 U.S. 625 and
Oldrovd, 685 P.2d at 555. Those cases, which were decided after Murch. recognize that
due process requires that lesser included offense instructions be given in appropriate
circumstances. Moreover, those decisions recognize that failure to give an appropriate
lesser included offense instruction deprives a defendant of a substantial right. Contrary
to Murch, the United States Supreme Court considers the refusal to give a lesser offense
instruction the deprivation of a substantial right, and has held that a lesser instruction is
required by due process because it provides "a less drastic alternative to the choice
between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal." Beck. 447 U.S. at 633.
Because the reasoning and holding in Murch was essentially overruled by Beck and
Oldroyd, Murch is not persuasive and provides no guidance in analyzing Utah's statutory
scheme. Contrary to the state's claim that the Court of Appeals' holding in this case
precludes the district court from giving lesser included offense instructions in Serious
Youth Offender cases, Utah's statutory scheme and due process allow and require such
lesser instructions just as they do in any criminal case.
(b) The Procedure Requiring Remand Is Workable, Fair and Simple.
Despite the fact that the language of the Act required remand when a juvenile was
acquitted of the charges, the state argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
remand was required in this case because such remand creates an unworkable procedure.
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S.B. at 11-12. According to the state, the procedure embraced by the Court of Appeals
raises a question as to when exactly the district court loses jurisdiction and requires the
juvenile court to sentence juveniles and hear motions for new trial even though the
juvenile judge did not try the case. The state complains that this procedure is "unwieldy"
and therefore not intended by the Legislature. S.B. at 12-13.
Contrary to the state's complaints, the procedure is workable and provides a fair
and simple approach to be utilized when a juvenile is not convicted of the serious crime
which provided the basis for the transfer to district court. When the jury returned an
acquittal on the Serious Youth Offender charge or the district court judge accepted a plea
to a lesser charge, the case was to be remanded. See. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^J19.
Remanding at that point was obvious and easily accomplished. Rather than setting a
sentencing date, as judges ordinarily do when a verdict is returned or a defendant pleads
guilty, the judge remanded to juvenile court.
Having a juvenile judge sentence the minor or hear any motion for new trial
likewise does not present any insurmountable barriers. A transcript of the trial will be
available in most cases for the juvenile judge to review, making the juvenile court
capable of assessing whether a motion for new trial should be granted and informing the
judge of any details of the trial which might be relevant to sentencing. Moreover,
disposition in juvenile court is different from sentencing in district court. A juvenile is
not convicted of a crime and is instead adjudicated a delinquent; after the adjudication,
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the juvenile court has the option of many different dispositions, as outlined in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-516 (1996). In choosing the appropriate disposition, the juvenile judge
considers the bests interests of the minor as well as the interests of the public. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-516(2)(t); 78-3a-102(5) (1996). This necessarily requires knowledge
not only of the facts of the case at hand, but also complete knowledge regarding the
juvenile's background, including the juvenile's family situation, prior involvement with
the juvenile system, educational level, and any other factor about the juvenile's life
which will aid the juvenile court in fashioning an appropriate disposition which is aimed
at rehabilitating the juvenile.
A judge's presence at the trial is a minor aspect, if indeed it is important at all, in
assessing the appropriate disposition for a minor. Given the breadth of information
considered by a juvenile judge in choosing a disposition, the fact that the juvenile judge
was not present at the trial does not present an unworkable situation which should
deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction. Moreover, it makes little sense to deprive a
juvenile who has not committed a serious offense of the benefits of the rehabilitative
nature of the juvenile court simply because the juvenile judge did not preside at the trial;
from a policy perspective, it is far more important for a juvenile who has not committed a
serious offense to be dealt with appropriately by the juvenile system, and perhaps be
rehabilitated, than it is for the judge who sentences the juvenile to have been present at
trial.
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In support of its argument that the Court of Appeals erred in remanding this case
to the juvenile court, the state relies on footnotes in Judge Orme's concurrence. S.B. at
12, citing Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^|24, n.l, 2. The state ignores, however, the fact that
despite his concerns, Judge Orme agreed with the majority in this case that subsection
(10) required remand to the juvenile court when Joseph was acquitted of attempted
homicide. Id at 1fl[21, 25 (Orme, J., concurring). As Judge Orme pointed out, the state's
proposed interpretation of the Act would require a conclusion that subsection (10) is
"meant to say nothing at all and was just wasting space in the Utah Code ...." Id. at ^[25.
In concluding that subsection (10) required that this case be remanded to the juvenile
court, Judge Orme stated:
One view-that offered by the State-is that subsection 10 merely
recognizes that if a juvenile defendant is cleared of any and all charges in a
proceeding that originated under the Serious Youth Offender Act, the
juvenile justice system may go ahead and deal with unrelated matters
involving the juvenile. The glaring difficulty with this interpretation is that
this would be exactly the result if subsection 10 did not exist. In other
words, under this interpretation subsection 10 merely states the obvious
and is completely unnecessary. Courts are understandably reluctant to
conclude that legislatures would enact into law provisions that do nothing
at all.
Id. at ^f22 (emphasis added). After considering the state's proposed interpretation, Judge
Orme rejected that approach because such interpretation would render subsection 10
meaningless. Id at ^25. Given the fact that the certification and direct file statutes have
a different approach along with the general notion that the legislature includes language
for a reason, Judge Orme's conclusion that the state's interpretation fails because it
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would render subsection 10 meaningless is correct.
The state's incorrect claim that the Court of Appeals' decision in this case creates
an unworkable procedure does not provide a basis for disregarding the language of the
statute and rules of statutory interpretation. The language of the Act, rules of statutory
interpretation, and the purposes served by the juvenile court all demonstrate that the
Court of Appeals correctly held that this case must be remanded to the juvenile court.
(c) Other States Require Remand When a Juvenile Is Acquitted or There Is
a Dismissal of the Offense Which Provided the Basis for Adult Court
Jurisdiction; Such a Procedure Ensures Fairness and Furthers the Purposes
of the Juvenile Court Act.
The state attempts to bolster its argument by claiming that all other states which
have considered the issue have rejected the Utah statutory scheme which requires remand
when a juvenile is convicted of an offense that does not fall within the district court
jurisdiction. S.B. at 13. While the statutory schemes of other states provide no guidance
in interpreting Utah's Serious Youth Offender Act, the state's claim that other states have
rejected the Utah procedure also provides no support for the state because it is incorrect.
A number of states require remand to the juvenile court when the juvenile is not
convicted of the offense which provided the basis for the transfer. See e.g. Green v.
Montgomery, 746 N.E.2d 1036, 1040 (N.Y. 2001) (recognizing that a case is remanded
to juvenile court when a juvenile is acquitted of charge which provided the basis for
adult court jurisdiction); Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 156 N.E.2d 649, 652-53 (Mass.
1959) (recognizing that a juvenile, who was convicted of offense over which adult court
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did not have jurisdiction, committed a delinquency and not a crime, and holding that case
must be remanded to juvenile court even though adult court initially had jurisdiction
based on the nature of the charges); State v. Torres. 538 A.2d 185, 192 (Conn. 1998)
(holding that case is remanded to juvenile court for trial on lesser charge of manslaughter
after state failed to establish probable cause on murder charge which had been filed
directly in adult court); Bedford, 190 So. at 351 (holding that case is remanded to
juvenile court when the juvenile is convicted of a lesser over which the adult court does
not have jurisdiction); Statton., 594 N.Y.S.2d at 582-83 (holding that juvenile was not
"legally responsible11 for lesser crime to which he pleaded guilty and case therefore must
be remanded to juvenile court); see. also State v. Warden, 308 So. 2d 749 (La. 1975)
(holding that district court did not have jurisdiction to accept guilty plea to lesser charge
or to sentence juvenile, and remanding to juvenile court); State ex reL Johnson v.
Blackburn, 384 So.2d 402, 403-04 (La. 1980) (same); State ex rel Stiegel v. Chapman ,
161 So. 424 (Fla. 1935) (ordering that case be remanded to juvenile court so that juvenile
could be sentenced as a delinquent after juvenile was convicted of assault with intent to
commit a felony); Murch, 189 N.E. at 21-22 (indicating that adult court would not have
jurisdiction over lesser). In addition to case law, a number of statutes from other states
have explicitly required that a case which has been transferred to adult court is to be
remanded to the juvenile court when the juvenile is not convicted of the offense which
provided the basis for the transfer. See e.g. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(j) (Michie
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1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-518(l)(d)(IV) (West 1999); Ga. Code Ann. §15-1128(b)(2)(D) (2000); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 310.85 (McKinney 2002); Tenn. Code Ann.
§37-l-134(c)(1998).
One rationale for remanding a case to juvenile court when the juvenile is not
convicted of an offense which provides for adult court jurisdiction is that the minor has
not committed a crime, and has instead committed a delinquency which requires juvenile
court supervision. See e ^ Green, 746 N.E.2d at 1039-40. The Metcalf court recognized
that under Massachusetts' statutory scheme, a juvenile who commits certain offenses
commits a crime and is subject to criminal court jurisdiction. Metcalf, 156 N.E.2d at
652. When that juvenile is convicted of a lesser offense, however, the minor "was guilty
of conduct which, in view of his age, constituted delinquency and not a crime.ff IdL at
653. Because the juvenile committed a delinquency and not a crime, the criminal court
could not impose a sentence and the case was remanded to the juvenile court. IdL; see
also Statton, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 582 (interests of justice required that case be remanded to
juvenile court when minor was convicted of lesser offense rather than offense which
provided basis for transfer because juvenile was not "criminally responsible" for lesser
offense under statutory scheme). The rationale that the juvenile has committed a
delinquency rather than a crime is consistent with Utah's statutory scheme which
provides that an offense committed by a juvenile is a delinquency unless the offense or
circumstances allow for adult court jurisdiction.
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Additionally, remanding a case to juvenile court when the juvenile is convicted of
a lesser offense rather than the offense which provided the basis for the transfer furthers
the policies underlying the juvenile system. See Torres, 538 A.2d at 192. Utah's
statutory scheme evidences an intent that offenses committed by juveniles be treated as
delinquencies within the juvenile system unless the crime fits within the direct or Serious
Youth Offender statutes, or the juvenile requires certification. The protections afforded
juveniles in the juvenile system and the focus on treatment and rehabilitation pertain to
lesser offenses which do not qualify for Serious Youth Offender treatment. As the Court
of Appeals recognized, "it would be contrary to the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act of
1996 to interpret the term 'charges' in subsection 10 to include charges other than those
requiring bind-over under the Serious Youth Offender Act." Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224,
*|fl8. The Court of Appeals' holding that a case must be remanded to the juvenile court
when the minor is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for district court
jurisdiction furthers the policies of the juvenile system by treating the lesser crimes as
delinquencies for which the juvenile is not criminally responsible rather than as crimes
which require adult punishment.
Fairness also requires that a case be remanded to the juvenile court when the
juvenile is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for the transfer. See State v.
BeW, 564 N.W.2d 560, 571 (Minn. 1997) (Keith, C.J., dissenting). Remand ensures that
juveniles who committed the same crime are subjected to the same potential punishment,
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and prevents the unfairness of subjecting a juvenile who was charged with a more
serious crime, but acquitted of that crime, from being subjected to the harsher penalties
of the adult system simply because an information was filed. The dissent in Behl
recognized the unfairness of subjecting a juvenile to adult punishments even though the
juvenile was acquitted of the crime which transferred the case to adult court when other
juveniles who commit the same lesser offense receive the benefits of the juvenile system.
Id. (Keith, C.J., dissenting).
The weakness of the majority's rationale would not be so troubling if the
results seemed fair to juveniles [who are acquitted of the crime which
provided the basis for the transfer.] [footnote omitted]. But the
unavoidable consequence of the court's reasoning is that a child who is
indicted but acquitted of the enumerated offense (first-degree murder)
faces the harsher sentencing regime that the legislature crafted for adult
perpetrators, while a child who is fortunate enough not to be indicted for
first-degree murder in the first place is sentenced according to the juvenile
court rules. ... The statute does not say that certain juveniles should be
treated "much more harshly," [citation omitted] simply because they have
been indicted, and despite exoneration by a jury. To do so, it seems, is to
punish the juvenile for a crime he or she did not commit.
Id. (Keith, C.J., dissenting).
Finally, the Court of Appeals' holding that a Serious Youth Offender case must be
remanded to juvenile court when the minor is acquitted of the charge which provided the
basis for district court jurisdiction is consistent with the rule of lenity. See State v.
Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 562 n. 3 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting); State v. Tapp . 490
P.2d 334, 336 (Utah 1971). "It is well established that ambiguities in criminal statutes
must be resolved in favor of lenity." Egbert, 748 P.2d at 562 n. 3. One of the "time
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honored rules of the criminal law" is that if there is an ambiguity as to the severity of the
punishment, the more lenient alternative applies. Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336. Given the
significant increase in the severity of treatment in the adult system and the critical
importance of the question as to whether a juvenile case should be given adult court
treatment (State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1990) (quoting State in re
Clatterbuck. 700 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1985)), the rule of lenity requires that any
ambiguity as to whether the case must be remanded be resolved in favor of remand.
Contrary to the state's claims, other states require that a case be remanded to the
juvenile court when a juvenile is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for
adult court jurisdiction or that charge is dismissed. Remanding to the juvenile court
under such circumstances furthers the purposes of the juvenile court and ensures fairness
in the prosecution of juveniles.
(2) The Legislative Amendment to Subsection (10), Which Went Into Effect
After the State Filed Its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Does Not Change
the Interpretation of the Version Subsection (10) Applicable to this Case.
The state claims that a recent amendment to the Serious Youth Offender Act,
made well after final judgment in Joseph's case, applies to this case and overrules the
Court of Appeals' decision. S.B. at 14-20. Despite the fact that this amendment was
made after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion and apparently in response to that
opinion, the state asks this Court to consider the language of the amendment as
controlling this issue. Id. Such an approach is unwarranted and unacceptable since the
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amendment substantively changes the nature of the penalty applicable to this case and
significantly increases punishment retroactively.
The amendment, which was passed and went into effect after this Court had
granted the state's petition for writ of certiorari changes the Act by stating that if the
defendant is convicted of a lesser offense, the district court retains jurisdiction.
(10) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges
filed or any other offense arisingfromthe same criminal episode, the
district court retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including
sentencing.
(11) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over
the juvenile when there is an acquittal, afindingof not guilty, or dismissal
of all charges in the district court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) & (11) (as amended by S.B. 26, 54th Leg. (2002).
Despite the fact that the amendment significantly increases punishment and
dramatically changes the nature of the adjudication from a delinquency to a conviction,
the state claims that the amendment is remedial and procedural and therefore applies to
Joseph, whose case should have been remanded to the juvenile court three years ago
when he was acquitted of attempted homicide. Applying the recent amendment to this
case would violate Utah Code Ann, § 68-3-3 (2002) and the state and federal protections
against ex post facto laws. It would be fundamentally unfair to apply a legislative
amendment aimed directly at this case to increase the appropriate disposition from a
juvenile adjudication of delinquency to a criminal conviction carrying a prison sentence
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of five years to life.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 mandates that a statutory amendment should not be
applied retroactively unless the amendment explicitly states that it is to be applied
retroactively. Id. The statute states, M[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared." Id. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 embodies the "longstanding rule of statutory construction" that courts "do not apply retroactively legislative
enactments that alter substantive law or affect vested rights unless the legislature has
clearly expressed that intention." Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261
(Utah 1998) (citations omitted).
An exception to the general rule against retroactivity does exist when the changes
are procedural only. Olsen, 956 P.2d at 261. This exception is "narrowly drawn,"
however, and applies only to ""the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by
which the substantive law is determined or made effective.'" IdL. (citation omitted). If
the amendment destroys, eliminates or enlarges vested or contract rights, it is substantive
in nature and cannot be applied retroactively. IdL.
The amendment to subsection (10) was substantive in nature and therefore cannot
be applied retroactively to this case. "'"Substantive law is defined as the positive law
which creates, defines and regulates the rights of the parties which may give rise to a
cause of action ... ."'" Brown & Root Indust. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 947 P.2d
671, 675 (Utah 1997) (further citations omitted). This Court has held that substantive

38

changes preclude retroactive application in a variety of cases, including: (1) amendment
to notice requirements which alter rights to workers' compensation (01sen_, 956 P.2d at
261); (2) change to statute of limitations which would revive a cause of action if applied
retroactively (Roark v. Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1995)); (3) changes which
eliminate workers' compensation claims (Brown & Root Indus. Serv., 947 P.2d at 676);
and (4) a change which prohibited contingent fee arrangements where such arrangements
were legal at the time the agreement was entered into (Cache County v. Property Tax
Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758, 766 (Utah 1996)).
Assuming the amendment to subsection (10) requires that the district court retain
jurisdiction in any future Serious Youth Offender case when the juvenile is acquitted of
the serious offense but convicted of a lesser offense, that change is substantive in nature
and directly impacts on the rights of the parties. At the time of the original judgment in
this case, the Act required that the juvenile court regained jurisdiction because Joseph
was acquitted of the Serious Youth Offender offense and convicted of a charge which
did not qualify for district court jurisdiction. See. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^fl9.
Because the juvenile court had jurisdiction, the matter was a civil delinquency rather than
a criminal conviction. As this Court has recognized, "there are critically important
differences in the treatment of those juveniles tried as adults compared to those left in the
juvenile system." State v. MohL 901 P.2d 991, 998 (Utah 1995). This Court recognized
the significantly more lenient treatment which occurs when a juvenile is adjudicated as a
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delinquent:
For instance, cases tried in the juvenile court are considered civil rather
than criminal proceedings. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-3a-44(l). This has
significant ramifications for an individual's future criminal record.
Moreover, any juvenile committed to a secure facility under the direction of
the Division of Youth Corrections must be released at age twenty-one.
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-108(1).
Id
This Court acknowledged the "dramatic contrast" between the significantly
harsher penalties and consequences that a juvenile faces when he is convicted in district
court and the consequences a juvenile faces in juvenile court:
Aside from acquiring a permanent criminal record, this juvenile [facing
charges in district court] faces a potential life sentence or, in the case of a
capital felony, death, obviously a much greater deprivation of personal
liberty than is risked by his or her counterpart who is tried as a juvenile.
Moreover, rather than facing detention at a juvenile facility, these offenders
are eligible for housing in the state prison or other adult facilities, [citations
omitted.]
Id. In fact, the significantly harsher treatment in the adult system resulted in unequal
treatment for juveniles whose cases were directly filed. Id. The recognition in Mohi that
juveniles face significantly harsher penalties and consequences in the adult system than
they do in the juvenile system demonstrates that the amendment is substantive in nature.
Comparing this amendment to other changes which this Court has concluded are
substantive further demonstrates the substantive nature of this amendment. Just as a
change which eliminates recovery of a workers' compensation claim is substantive, this
amendment which precludes a juvenile from receiving the benefits and lesser
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consequences of the juvenile system is substantive. Likewise, just as a change in the
statute of limitations which would revive a cause of action cannot be retroactively
applied because one of the parties would suffer more severe consequences than existed
under the statute of limitations which had been exhausted, the amendment in this case
cannot be retroactively applied because it creates an adult court conviction where one did
not previously exist.
The state claims that despite the fact that the Legislature did not expressly state
that this amendment was to be applied retroactively, the amendment nevertheless applies
retroactively to this case because the amendment was procedural in nature and merely a
"clarification or amplification as to how the law should have been understood prior to its
enactment." S.B. at 16, quoting Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1979)
(quoting Okland Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n. 520 P.2d 208, 210-11 (Utah 1974)).
The state's claim fails, however, because the amendment is neither procedural in nature
nor merely a clarification of the Act prior to the amendment.
First, as set forth supra, the amendment is not procedural in nature and instead
affects a juvenile's substantive rights by significantly increasing the penalties and
consequences faced by a juvenile who is convicted of a non-Serious Youth Offender
offense in district court. The state claims that the amendment does not affect any vested
rights because a juvenile does not have the right to treatment in the juvenile system. S.B.
at 20. While a juvenile may not have a constitutional right to treatment in the juvenile
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system, under the Act prior to the recent amendment, juveniles had a right to have their
cases remanded to the juvenile court when they were acquitted of the offense which
provided the basis for the bindover. In other words, prior to the amendment, Joseph had
a vested right to have his case returned to the juvenile court pursuant to subsection (10)
of the Act. See Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^19. Because the Act mandated that the case
be remanded, Joseph's substantial rights were affected by the amendment regardless of
whether he had a constitutional right to have the juvenile court hear his case. The state
confuses statutory rights with constitutional rights when it makes this argument and is
incorrect in asserting that Joseph's rights were not affected by the amendment.
Because the amendment affects Joseph's substantive rights, it does more than
merely affect"'the judicial machinery available for determining the substantive rights of
a juvenile'" (S.B. at 20 (quoting Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n. 953 P. 2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998))). In Evans & Sutherland . this Court
considered an amendment which changed the procedure for review of a Utah State Tax
Commission decision. 953 P.2d at 435. Prior to the amendment, a tax commission
decision could be reviewed only pursuant to a petition for review filed in this Court; the
amendment allowed review either by this Court pursuant to such a petition or a de novo
review in the district court. This Court held that the amendment changing the procedure
available for review did not affect the substantive rights of the parties and instead was a
procedural change which could be applied retroactively. IdL. at 438. Because the
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amendment "controlled] the mode and form of procedure for enforcing the underlying
substantive rights in the valuation dispute between the Board and Evans & Sutherland"
and "[t]he substantive law pertinent to this dispute had not changed," this Court held that
the amendment was procedural in nature. Id.
By contrast, the amendment in this case does not merely change the procedure for
enforcing the rights of the parties. Instead, it changes the nature of the proceeding from
civil to criminal and the nature of the judgment from a delinquency adjudication to a
criminal conviction. The amendment does not merely change the court in which a party
can pursue an appeal in a civil matter, as was the case in Evans & Sutherland. Instead,
the amendment significantly changes the penalties and consequences for a juvenile
offender, subjects the juvenile to the possibility of adult incarceration, imposes an adult
criminal record on the juvenile, and otherwise impacts substantively on the nature of the
case. Accordingly, Evans & Sutherland does not support the state's argument that this
change is merely procedural in nature.
Nor does State v. Daniels. 2002 UT 2, f t l , 40 P.3d 611 support the state's claim
that this amendment is procedural in nature. In Daniels, this Court held that an
amendment which changed the number of jurors necessary to impose life without parole
in a capital case from twelve to ten was procedural in nature. IdL_ This Court concluded
in Daniels that the amendment was procedural because "[it] has nothing to do with the
substance of defendant's crime or the amount of punishment specified for it; it deals with
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the procedure by which the jury arrives at a decision on the amount of punishment to
impose from sentencing alternatives." IdL.
In contrast to Daniels, the amendment in this case affects both the substance of
Joseph's offense and the amount and nature of punishment which can be imposed. To
the extent the amendment requires that the case remain in district court despite the
acquittal on the offense which provided the basis for the bindover, the substance of the
conviction for the lesser offense is changed from a civil delinquency to a criminal
conviction. Moreover, as this Court recognized in Mohi, 901 P.2d at 998, the nature of
the punishment is increased dramatically when a conviction is entered in adult court
rather than an adjudication in juvenile court. The amendment is therefore procedural in
nature and cannot be applied retroactively because it deprives Joseph of his rights and
imposes greater liability on him. See Foil,601 P.2d at 151 (quoting Okland Constr. Co.
v. Indus. Comm'n. 520 P.2d 208, 210, 211 (Utah 1974).
Relying on Foil and Okland Constr. Co., the state also argues that the amendment
can be imposed retroactively because it merely clarifies the original statute. S.B. at 17-20.
A review of those cases establishes, however, that an amendment which is substantive
in nature cannot be considered merely a clarification.
In Foil, this Court considered the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act of 1976 and
an amendment to that Act which was passed in 1979. Foil. 601 P.2d at 149-52. The Act
itself included a requirement that the plaintiff serve a notice of intent to sue on the
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defendant. Id The 1979 amendment explicitly stated that the notice requirement was
not to be applied retroactively. IcL This Court held that the 1979 amendment was not
substantive in nature because it did not deprive a party of any rights or impose greater
liability on a party. Id. at 151. Rather than affecting substantive rights, the amendment
merely clarified that the Legislature had not intended the notice requirement to be
retroactive when it passed the Act. IdL.
In concluding that the amendment was just a clarification in Foil, this Court
recognized the potential unfairness and mischief of allowing the Legislature to control
the outcome of a case by passing a law after the fact to accomplish that purpose.
We recognize the potential mischief, indeed, the grave constitutional
problems, that could arise if the Legislature were to attempt to determine
the outcome of a particular case by passage of a law intended to accomplish
such a purpose. There is, however, no such difficulty here. The
Legislature in this case has merely acted to effectuate its original intent
with respect to the notice of intent to sue provision.
IdL at 151. If the state's argument that this substantive change is merely a clarification
and can be retroactively applied were embraced, the Legislature could carry out
significant "mischief by overriding appellate court decisions by simply having a member
of the Legislature state that the amendment is a clarification rather than a change.
While the amendment in Foil did not deprive a party of rights or impose greater
liability and instead merely clarified that the procedural requirement of serving a notice
of intent to sue did not apply retroactively, the amendment in this case does impose
greater liability because it changes the substantive meaning of the statute. Rather than
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simply clarifying that a required procedural prerequisite does not apply retroactively, this
amendment changes the nature of the offense and the punishment for juveniles who are
bound over under the Serious Youth Offender Act, but convicted of a lesser offense.
Additionally, in Foil, the Legislature as a whole passed an amendment which
explicitly stated that the notice requirement was not to be applied to causes of action
which arose prior to the 1976 Act. 601 P.2d at 150. By contrast, the amendment to the
Serious Youth Offender Act does not explicitly address the retroactive application of that
amendment. Had the Legislature intended to merely clarify its prior intent, explicit
language to that effect could have been included in the amendment. The fact that explicit
language regarding the retroactive application of the amendment was not included works
against retroactive application of the amendment, particularly in light of the fact that the
Legislature was aware of the Court of Appeals' decision in this case.
Along the same lines, the remarks of a single senator do not clearly indicate that
the amendment was merely a clarification and do not speak for the entire Legislature. As
the state recognizes, f'[f]loor debates, including statements by a bill's sponsor, are at best
an uncertain guide to statutory construction." S.B. at 17 (citations omitted). While the
isolated remarks may give some sense of what a single senator thought the amendment
might accomplish, they fail to establish that the amendment was merely a clarification of
the Legislature's intent several years before when it passed the Act.
The remarks of a sole senator and representative also fail to establish that the
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amendment was merely a clarification because the remarks themselves seem to confuse
the impact and functioning of the Serious Youth Offender Act. Despite the fact that the
amendment would require juveniles to be bound over to district court and remain there
even if they have no juvenile history and even if they are not in fact convicted of the
violent offense which provided the basis for the transfer, the amendment's sponsor
continues to indicate that the Act and amendment are aimed only at teenagers who have
committed violent, out of control crimes and who have exhausted the resources of the
juvenile court.
I don't know how much background I want to give you on the
Serious Youth Offender. I won't give you a lot but I think you need to
know why we're doing what we're doing. The Serious Youth Offender
was an action we took several years ago with a deep concern about some of
the youths who were 16 and 17 years old who would normally be so out of
control that the juvenile system would have no impact whatsoever. We had
to have a mechanism whereby we could move them into the adult system
where the emphasis is more on safety and less on rehabilitation because of
the limited dollars we have in the juvenile court system in which the
primary emphasis is on rehabilitation.
Recording of the Proceedings of the 2002 General Session, presentation of S.B. 26 to the
Utah State Senate, Jan. 22, 2002, Day 2, Tape 4, Tr. at 1 (emphasis added); see
Addendum E. Later, in explaining the impact of the proposed amendment, Senator
Hilly ard again emphasized that the Serious Youth Offender Act was aimed at transferring
juveniles who committed serious, violent felonies into the adult system.
We made the decision when we did the Serious Youth Offender that //
someone does something that serious, they 've had that kind of background
and that kind of help, the decision we made is that the rehabilitative thrust
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of juvenile court should no longer be available to them. They ought to
move into the adult system with the emphasis on public safety. So what the
bill says is, if that happens again, because we've made the decision to move
them over to the adult system, they'll stay in the adult system and be treated
for the conviction of the misdemeanor as though they had been an adult
and convicted of the same misdemeanor and treated there.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). This continued focus by the Act's sponsor on transferring
violent juveniles who had committed a serious crime and who were not amenable to
rehabilitation in the juvenile system demonstrates that the Act was aimed at giving adult
consequences only to those youth who commit serious violent felonies. Indeed, the
amendment's sponsor suggests that pursuant to the amendment, juveniles will stay in
district court even if they are convicted of a lesser offense because they have "expended
[the juvenile system's] patience, programs and time

" Recording of the Proceedings

of the 2002 General Session, presentation of S.B. 26 to the Utah State Senate, Jan. 23,
2002, Tape 5, Tr. at 1. These remarks indicating that the Act and the amendment are
aimed at transferring juveniles who commit violent crimes and who have exhausted the
resources of the juvenile system support the notion that the Act as originally passed
required that a case be remanded to the juvenile court if the minor was not convicted of
the felony which provided the basis for the transfer.5

5

The continued emphasis on transferring teens who have committed violent
felonies and who have exhausted the resources of the juvenile system also suggests that
the amendment's sponsor did not fully appreciate the impact of amending the Act with
the current subsection (10). To the extent the amendment requires that a case remain in
district court even if the juvenile is not convicted of a serious offense, a juvenile who has
no delinquency history and who is overcharged and bound over on an aggravated
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Additionally, applying the recent amendment retroactively violates the prohibition
against ex post facto laws found in Utah Const. Art. I, § 18 and U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10,
cl. I.6 This Court has defined ex post facto laws as laws which increase the punishment
for a crime after the crime is done or which make something a crime which was not a
crime when done.
An ex post facto law is one that punishes as a crime an act previously
committed, which was innocent when done; one that makes more
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which
deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available according to
law at the time when the act was committed.
Daniels, 2002 UT 2, TJ43 (citing State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 (Utah 1983)) (further
citations omitted). As previously outlined, the amendment to subsection (10) increases
punishment by changing the nature of the adjudication from a civil delinquency to an
adult felony conviction. It punishes as a crime any lesser offense even though prior to
the amendment, the lesser offense was merely a delinquency. Accordingly, the
application of the recent amendment to this case violates the ex post facto prohibitions
found in the state and federal constitutions.
robbery would be subject to adult consequences even though the evidence ultimately
established that the offense was merely a class B misdemeanor theft. Rather than
focusing on rehabilitation of the juvenile under these circumstances, the Act would
require imposition of adult consequences. Although the juvenile did not have "that kind
of background" and had not had "that kind of help," the juvenile would nevertheless not
receive rehabilitative benefits of the juvenile system.
6

This Court has interpreted the ex post facto clause found in Article I, section 18
of the Utah Constitution consistently with the federal ex post facto protection. Daniels ,
2002 UT 2,1J42.
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CONCLUSION
The version of the Serious Youth Offender Act in effect up until earlier this year
required that this case be remanded to juvenile court when Joseph was acquitted of the
serious offense which provided the basis for the transfer to district court. The Court of
Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court erred when it failed to remand the case to
juvenile court. Respondent/Defendant Joseph Tunzi respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and order that his case be remanded to the
juvenile court.
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DAVIS, Judge
1]1 Joseph Tunzi challenges the district court's jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction for aggravated
assault, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 76-5-103(1 )(b) (1999) We vacate the district court's
judgment of conviction and remand to the district court with instructions to transfer the case to juvenile court for
entry of an adjudication of guilt for third degree felony aggravated assault
BACKGROUND
fl2 In the fall of 1998, when Tunzi was seventeen years old, he got into a fight with another young man The State
filed an information in juvenile court charging Tunzi with attempted murder After a hearing held pursuant to Utah
Code Ann § 78-3a-602 (1996) (Serious Youth Offender Act), the juvenile court bound Tunzi over to district court
to be tried as an adult
P Following a two day jury trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of attempted murder and the lesser

included offense of aggravated assault. The aggravated assault instruction included elements of both the second
and third degree felony versions of that crime. After deliberating, the jury found Tunzi not guilty of attempted
murder and guilty of aggravated assault.1 ] However, because the aggravated assault instruction contained
elements of both the second and third degree felony versions of aggravated assault, Tunzi moved for a new trial
or, in the alternative, entry of a conviction for aggravated assault as a third degree felony. The State conceded
that the appropriate remedy for the equivocal instruction and general verdict was conviction for aggravated
assault as a third degree felony.
114 After the State conceded that Tunzi should be convicted for aggravated assault as a third degree felony, Tunzi
moved the court to remand his case to the juvenile court. Tunzi argued that the district court would lose
jurisdiction if he was found guilty of third degree felony aggravated assault because that offense is not one of the
serious youth offender offenses enumerated in section 78-3a-602(1) allowing bind-over. The district court denied
Tunzi's motion to remand the case to juvenile court and entered a judgment of conviction for the third degree
felony version of aggravated assault. The court then sentenced Tunzi to serve an indeterminate term of zero to
five years in the Utah State Prison.1^
1J5 Tunzi appealed his conviction arguing that the district court erred when it refused to remand his case to
juvenile court. Tunzi also argued there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated assault.
After filing his notice of appeal, Tunzi discovered that the videotape and transcript from one day of his trial were
missing. Tunzi then moved for summary reversal, and the State conceded that reversal was appropriate. The
court of appeals denied Tunzi's motion and remanded the case to the trial court to reconstruct the record pursuant
to Rule 11(g) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Tunzi appealed the court of appeals decision to the Utah
Supreme Court. On certiorari, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial
court for a new trial. See State v. Tunzi, 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816. The supreme court held that reconstruction of
the record was inappropriate because "[t]he burdens and futility associated with reconstructing a record are
increased exponentially when the issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction .. . ." [d, at 1J3. Neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court addressed the merits of Tunzi's first
appeal.
116 On remand, the State moved to proceed under the original information charging Tunzi with attempted murder.
— However, pursuant to plea negotiations, the State amended the original information to charge Tunzi with the
third degree felony version of aggravated assault. Tunzi pleaded guilty to this charge; however, he did not renew
his motion to remand his case to juvenile court. In accordance with the plea agreement, the district court again
sentenced Tunzi to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. However, the court gave Tunzi credit for the
twenty-one months he had already served and suspended the remainder of the sentence. Tunzi appeals the
district court's judgment of conviction.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
117 Whether the Serious Youth Offender Act required the district court to remand Tunzi's case to the juvenile court
involves a question of statutory construction which "we review for correctness and give no deference to the
conclusions of the trial court." Adkinsv. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 2000 UT 14,1111, 1 P.3d 528.
ANALYSIS
H8 Tunzi asserts, pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act, the district court lost jurisdiction and was required
to remand the case to juvenile court when the jury acquitted him of the attempted murder charge and found him
guilty of what was ultimately determined to be third degree felony aggravated assault.
H9 The Serious Youth Offender Act provides the procedure by which a juvenile may be "bound over and held to
answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(b) (1996). One
of the prerequisites for binding a minor over to district court is that the minor be charged with one of the
specifically enumerated offenses listed in the Serious Youth Offender Act. See id. § 78-3a-602(1)(a) (listing
attempted murder and second degree felony aggravated assault as charges warranting bind-over).1^ However,
the Serious Youth Offender Act also provides: "The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of
Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the juvenile when there is an
acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court."'^IdL § 78-3a-602(10). .

1J10 As the above language clearly indicates, the Serious Youth Offender Act defines the jurisdictional parameters
of both the juvenile court and the district court in those instances when a minor is charged with one of the
offenses listed in section 78-3a-602(1)(a) Therefore, the Serious Youth Offender Act provides the district court
with subject matter jurisdiction over minors bound over to that court See Frankha Covey Client Sales v Melvin,
2000 UT App 110.1J24 n 3, 2 P 3d 451 ("Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority and competency of the court to
decide the case
") Consequently, any jurisdictional defect arising from misapplication of the statute cannot be
waived See James v Galetka, 965 P 2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct App 1998) (stating subject matter jurisdiction '"can
neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused'" (citation omitted)), In re E G T , 808 P 2d 138, 139
(Utah Ct App 1991) (stating, "a [subject matter] jurisdictional defect cannot be waived")
1J11 Here, the State argues that Tunzi waived his right to appeal when he pleaded guilty to third degree felony
aggravated assault Seejd at 140 (stating that "entry of an unconditional guilty plea constituted a waiver of the
claimed defects in the juvenile court certification proceedings") However, as stated above, the Serious Youth
Offender Act confers subject matter jurisdiction on the district court Therefore, Tunzi did not waive his claim of
error when he pleaded guilty to the charge of third degree felony aggravated assault Consequently, we address
the merits of Tunzi's appeal
1J12 The State charged Tunzi with attempted murder, and the juvenile court bound Tunzi over to district court
pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act Tunzi was then tried in district court where a jury acquitted him of
attempted murder Consequently, Tunzi was acquitted of the original charge that supported the juvenile court's
bind-over to district court Further, Tunzi was found guilty of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault,
and due to the ambiguous jury verdict, the court in effect dismissed the charge of second degree felony
aggravated assault ^
1J13 The State argues that the juvenile court did not regain jurisdiction over Tunzi because Tunzi was not
acquitted of second degree felony aggravated assault-an offense allowing bind-over under the Serious Youth
Offender Act However, the State ignores the language of the Serious Youth Offender Act which states that the
juvenile court regains jurisdiction if "there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the
district court" Id § 78-3a-602(10) (emphasis added) Upon the finding of not guilty of attempted murder and the
court's decision to grant Tunzi's motion to enter a conviction of third degree felony aggravated assault, the
juvenile court regained jurisdiction over Tunzi because there was "a finding of not guilty [and] dismissal of the
charges [enumerated in section 78-3a-602(1) and allowing bind-over to] district court" Utah Code Ann § 78-3a602(10) (1996) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it denied Tunzi's motion to transfer
jurisdiction back to the juvenile court prior to entry of his conviction
1J14 Finally, the State argues that the district court retained jurisdiction over Tunzi because Tunzi was convicted of
an offense arising out of the same criminal episode In support of its argument, the State points to subsection 7 of
the Serious Youth Offender Act See Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-602(7) (1996) Subsection 7 provides
When ajjefendant isj:harged with multiple criminal offenses in the same information or indictment
and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more charges under this section, other
offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies
charged against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the court finds
probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the defendant committed
them, the defendant shall also be bound over to the district court to answer for those charges
Id (emphasis added) The State reasons that the use of the term "charges" in subsection 10 includes the serious
youth offender charge(s) as well as any other charge arising out of the same criminal episode ld_ at § 78-3a-602
(10) Consequently, the State concludes that there must be an acquittal, finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all
offenses charged for the juvenile court to regain jurisdiction under subsection 10 See id
IP 5 While subsection 7 allows the district court to exercise jurisdiction over other offenses arising out of (and
after) the violent felony enumerated in section 78-3a-602(1) and allowing bind-over, the plain language of
subsection 7 requires that these offenses be charged in the same information Seejd In addition, subsection 7
requires the juvenile court to "find[] probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the
defendant committed them
" ld__ at § 78-3a-602 (7)

1J16 Here, the State charged Tunzi in the same information with the single offense of attempted murder. The State
did not charge Tunzi with "multiple criminal offenses in the same informationf,]" and the juvenile court's bind-over
did not necessarily include a finding of "probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and
that the defendant committed them . .. ." Id. at § 78-3a-602(7). Consequently, the third degree felony aggravated
assault was not an "other offense" under subsection 7, and the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter a
conviction therefor. Id,
1117 Further, even if it is assumed that the information effectively charges lesser included offenses prior to the
requested instructions on such offenses, the included offenses at that point can be only those "whose statutory
elements are necessarily included within the statutory elements of the charged offense." SJate_y. Cajruth, 1999
UT 107J13, 993 P.2d 869 (emphasis added). The elements of aggravated assault are not necessarily included
within the statutory elements of attempted murder. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1996) (listing elements
of criminal homicide) wjth id. § 76-5-103 (listing elements of aggravated assault including elements of intentionally
causing serious bodily injury to another or using a dangerous weapon or other means of force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury). Therefore, the information charging Tunzi with attempted murder did not include
the charge of aggravated assault at the time of the bind-over.
1J18 Finally, we find the State's argument unpersuasive because it would be contrary to the purposes of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1996 to interpret the term "charges" in subsection 10 to include charges other than those
requiring bind-over under the Serious Youth Offender Act. ^ See State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (stating "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it
is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in
accordance with its intent and purpose" (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Specifically, it would be unjust
and contrary to a minor's best interests to require a minor to "answer in district court in the same manner as an
adult" when the minor has not been convicted of any of the violent felonies enumerated in the Serious Youth
Offender A c t - See InreA.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating Serious Youth Offender Act
allows violent juveniles to be held accountable in district court to protect "the public from juveniles who are just as
dangerous as adult criminals"). Consequently, we conclude that the Legislature's use of the term "charges" in
subsection 10, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) (1996), refers to the serious youth offender charge(s) that require
a juvenile court to bind a minor over to district court and does not include "other offenses arising from the same
criminal episode." |cL § 78-30-602(7).
CONCLUSION
1J19 Tunzi was found not guilty of attempted murder, and the lesser included offense of second degree
aggravated assault was, in effect, dismissed. Although the trial court entered a conviction for third degree felony
aggravated assault, third degree felony aggravated assault is not an offense over which the district court may
retain jurisdiction over Tunzi. Therefore, the juvenile court regained jurisdiction over Tunzi pursuant to subsection
10 of the Serious Youth Offender Act at the time that Tunzi was acquitted of attempted murder and the court
determined that his conviction should be for third degree felony aggravated assault. Accordingly, we vacate
Tunzi's conviction and remand to the district court with instructions to transfer the case to the juvenile court for
entry of an adjudication of guilt for third degree felony aggravated assault.

James Z. Davis, Judge

1J20 I CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

ORME, Judge (concurring):
H21 I concur in the court's opinion, but must note that I find the statute to be, if not ambiguous, at least perplexing.
I believe the main issue presents a much closer question than the lead opinion recognizes.
1J22 My puzzlement concerns subsection 10 of the Serious Youth Offender Act, which states:
The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction
and any authority previously exercised over the juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not
guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) (1999). The subsection is capable of two interpretations, neither of which is very
satisfying. One view-that offered by the State-is that subsection 10 merely recognizes that if a juvenile defendant
is cleared of any and all charges in a proceeding that originated under the Serious Youth Offender Act, the
juvenile justice system may go ahead and deal with unrelated matters involving the juvenile. The glaring difficulty
with this interpretation is that this would be exactly the result if subsection 10 did not exist. In other words, under
this interpretation subsection 10 merely states the obvious and is completely unnecessary. Courts are
understandably reluctant to conclude that legislatures would enact into law provisions that do nothing at all.
1J23 The other view-the one offered by appellant and embraced in the lead opinion-is that the balance of a
proceeding will revert to the juvenile justice system once the core charge-and perhaps any other charge that
passes muster under subsection 7-has been resolved, even if the juvenile defendant stands convicted in district
court. Thus, a defendant could be properly tried in district court on a Serious Youth Offender Act crime. He could
be acquitted of that charge but convicted of a lesser included offense not before the district court pursuant to
subsection 7. If he were acquitted of the core charge, the district court in which he was convicted of the lesser
offense would, at the same instant, lose jurisdiction, and the case would revert to the juvenile court.
1J24 I am not aware of any explicit mechanism by which the juvenile court can take over a district court case that
has resulted in a conviction, whether by jury or bench trial or by plea bargain. If the Legislature really meant to
require such, I cannot imagine why it would not have provided some time frames, specified which court would
entertain motions for new t r i a l , ^ and made explicit the idea that the juvenile court would impose sentence.11^ In
short, I have a hard time believing the Legislature had in mind that part of a district court case-indeed, a district
court conviction-would revert to the juvenile court for further action without saying a little bit more about how such
an aberrational approach to criminal jurisprudence would work in practice.
TI25 Basically, then, we must decide whether the Legislature, in adopting subsection 10, meant to say nothing at
all and was just wasting space in the Utah Code, or whether it meant to say something but did not say it very
clearly or completely. Obviously, neither outcome is ideal. On balance, however, I believe the second option is
more defensible, and on that basis I concur in the court's opinion. In doing so, I recognize there is about a fifty
percent chance we are wrong. If we are, with the problem having been highlighted by this case, I am confident the
Legislature will speedily rectify our mistake.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. The verdict found Tunzi "guilty of aggravated assault, a lesser included offense of the Information."
2. The court also ordered Tunzi to pay restitution to the victim, attorney fees, and a combined fine and surcharge
of $5,000.00.
3. We also note that the case proceeded under the original case number.
4. The Serious Youth Offender Act also provides that, under certain circumstances, a minor may be bound over to

district court even if the minor has not been charged with one of the enumerated offenses However, Tunzi was
charged with one of the enumerated offenses, therefore, we focus our analysis on the offenses listed in
subsection (1)(a) See id
5 Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-104 (1996) enumerates matters over which the juvenile court has exclusive
jurisdiction
6 We also note that the Serious Youth Offender Act is contained in Part 6 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1996,
which is titled Transfer of Jurisdiction See Utah Code Ann §§ 78-3a-601 to -603 (1996)
7 The State conceded, and the court agreed, that the appropriate treatment of the ambiguous verdict was entry
of conviction for aggravated assault as a third degree lelony Therefore, when the court granted Tunzi's motion to
impose the third degree felony charge, the court's ruling operated as a de facto dismissal of the second degree
aggravated assault charge
8 The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act of 1996 is to, among other things, impose appropriate sanctions on
minors who have violated the law and strive to act in the best interests of the children in all cases See Utah Code
Ann §78-3a-102(5)(a)(g)(1996)

[TJhere are critically important differences in the treatment of those juveniles tried as adults
compared to those left in the juvenile system For instance, cases tried in the juvenile court are
considered civil rather than criminal proceedings [See] Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-[117 (Supp 2000)]
This has significant ramifications for an individual's future criminal record Moreover, any juvenile
committed to a secure facility under the direction of the Division of Youth Corrections must be
released at age twenty-one Utah Code Ann § 62A-7-108(1) Therefore, because section [78-3a602] applies only to individuals sixteen years of age or older, a juvenile in the statutory class who is
left in the juvenile system faces a maximum potential sentence of five years or less
The foregoing scenario is a dramatic contrast to that facing another juvenile in the same statutory
class who is charged as an adult
Aside from acquiring a permanent criminal record, this juvenile
faces
a much greater deprivation of personal liberty than that risked by his or her counterpart
who is tried as a juvenile Moreover, rather than facing detention at a juvenile facility, these
offenders are eligible for housing in the state prison or other adult facilities
State v Mohi, 901 P 2d 991, 998 (Utah 1995)
10 As the district court loses jurisdiction with the acquittal or dismissal of the core charge I guess the juvenile
court would necessarily entertain any motion for new trial concerning conviction on a lesser included offense
Such a scenario is problematic The juvenile court would have to decide whether, for instance, newly discovered
evidence would possibly change the outcome in a case it did not try
11 The sentencing implications are perhaps most troubling The view we adopt leaves a judge who did not
preside over the case imposing sentence

ADDENDUM B

78-3a-601. Jurisdiction of district court.
The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons
16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with:
(1) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult; or
(2) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the
minor has been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in
Section 62A-7-101.

78-3a-602. Serious youth offender — Procedure.
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by
criminal information andfiledin the juvenile court if the information charges
any of the following offenses:
(a) any felony violation of:
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(1 )(a), aggravated assault, involving intentionally causing serious bodily injury to another,
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping;
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary,
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of afirearmfrom a vehicle;
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder, or
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder, or
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an
adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have
been a felony if committed by an adult.
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by
the Utah Supreme Court.
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and
the burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall have
the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense
involving the use of a dangerous weapon.
(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under
this subsection, the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and

held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless
the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist:
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a
felony if committed by an adult;
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other
persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than
the codefendants; and
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner.
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this subsection as to a
showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going
forward and presenting evidence as to the existence of the above conditions.
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence
that all the above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its
findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed
upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but
that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to
bind the defendant over under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall
order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the
information as though it were a juvenile petition.
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest
shall issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other
criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordamce with Title 77,
Chapter 20, Bail.
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under
this section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need
not include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment
was committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court
shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b).
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged
against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the
court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed
and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound
over to the district court to answer for those charges.
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court
under this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand
jury, is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court.
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the
use of a dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of
the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court.
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilt]/, or dismissal of the
charges in the district court.

78-3a-603. Certification hearings — Juvenile court to
hold preliminary hearing — Factors considered
by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to
district court.
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78-3a502(3) alleges the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if
committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing.
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going
forward with its case and the burden of establishing:
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the
defendant committed it; and
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the
best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain
jurisdiction.
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests
of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the
juvenile court shall consider, and may base its decision on, the finding of one or
more of the following factors:
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the
community requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by
juvenile facilities;
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert
with two or more persons under circumstances which would subject the
minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult;
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner,
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons, except as provided in
Section 76-8-418;
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his
home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;
(f) the record and previous history of the minor;
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities
available to the juvenile court;

(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who
will be charged with a crime in the district court;
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense;
and
(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5.
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in
Subsection (3) is discretionary with the court.
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental,
physical, educational, and social history may be considered by the court.
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other
interested party, the court shall require the person or agency preparing
the report and other material to appear and be subject to both direct and
cross-examination.
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath,
call witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the
factors required by Subsection (3).
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the
court may enter an order
(a) certifying that finding; and
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the
district court.
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court need not include afindingof probable cause, but
the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the
additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2)(b).
(9) The provisions of Section 78-3a-512, Section 78-3a-513, and other
provisions relating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the
hearing held under this section to the extent they are pertinent.
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in
the district court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district
court.
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have
the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of
that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section
or when a criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction before a committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense
described in Section 78-3a-602, the jurisdiction of the Division of Youth
Corrections and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor is
terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the 3ame
criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged
against him, except as provided in Subsection (14).
(13) A minor may be convicted under this section on the charges filed or on
any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode.
(14) The-juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and die Division of Youth
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the
minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the
charges in the district court.
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Defendant was convicted in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake Department, Judith S.H. Atherton, J., of
aggravated assault. Defendant appealed. Defendant
filed motion for summary reversal upon discovery that
videotape of second day of trial had been lost and that
transcript consequently could not be prepared. The
Court of Appeals denied motion and remanded for trial
court to prepare statement of evidence or proceedings.
Defendant sought writ of certiorari. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that new trial, not attempt to
reconstruct record, was appropriate remedy in case in
which half of record had been lost and main issue was
sufficiency of evidence to support conviction.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.

West Headnotes
Criminal Law €=>1088.20
110kl088.20 Most Cited Cases
New trial, not attempt to reconstruct record through
statement of evidence or proceedings, was appropriate
remedy for loss of videotape that made it impossible to
prepare transcript for second day of two-day trial,
where one half of trial record had been lost and main
issue on appeal was sufficiency of evidence to support
conviction.
*816 Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Laura B. Dupaix, Asst.
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Joan C. Watt, John O'Connell, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
defendant.

ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS
MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER
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DURHAM, Justice:
If 1 Petitioner, Joseph P. Tunzi, by writ of certiorari,
seeks review of an order of remand issued by the court
of appeals directing the trial court to prepare and
approve a "statement of the evidence or proceedings"
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(g).
We grant petitioner's writ of certiorari, reverse the court
of appeals, and remand the case to the trial court for a
new trial.
*817 f 2 Following a two-day trial, petitioner was
convicted of aggravated assault, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999).
Subsequent to his conviction, petitioner filed a timely
notice of appeal raising the following two issues:
(1) Whether there was insufficient evidence for the
jury to convict petitioner of aggravated assault; and
(2) Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that
it had lost jurisdiction and failing to remand the case
back to juvenile court.
Petitioner's counsel thereafter learned that the trial
court was unable to locate the videotape of the second
day of trial, and that a transcript of that day would
therefore not be available. As a result, petitioner filed
a motion for summary reversal in the court of appeals
seeking a new trial. The State agreed that such a
reversal was appropriate. Ultimately, the court of
appeals denied petitioner's motion for summary
reversal and remanded the case with instructions to
reconstruct the record of the second day of trial.
If 3 We disagree with the court of appeals' action upon
petitioner's motion for summary reversal. A main
issue on appeal in this case is whether there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support petitioner's
conviction. Resolution of this issue will necessarily
involve reviewing the evidence contained in the record.
At present, the record does not contain evidence
presented on the second day of petitioner's two-day
trial. During that day, the State called half of its
witnesses, including the only witness directly
implicating petitioner. Thus, fully one half of the case
against petitioner is missing from the record. While
reconstruction of the record may be appropriate in
circumstances where only a minor portion of the record
is missing, such an attempt, in our experience, is
unduly burdensome for the trial court and the parties
when a major portion of the record is missing, as in the
instant case. Moreover, attempts to reconstruct major
portions of records often prove to be futile because
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

such reconstructions often fail to provide the detail
necessary to resolve the issues on appeal. The burdens
and futility associated with reconstructing a record are
increased exponentially when the issue on appeal
concerns the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, as it does here.
Therefore, to avoid
needless burdens and delay, we reverse the court of
appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new
trial.

U 4 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
RUSSON, Justice DURRANT, and Justice WILKINS
concur in Justice DURHAM'S opinion.
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM D

SENATE BILL 111
SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER

SENATE DEBATE
51ST LEGISLATURE
GENERAL SESSION
DAY 25--FEBRUARY 9, 1995
TAPE 2 0 AT 752
Secretary:

Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by
Senator Hillyard and the Committee Report
February 6, 1995: "Mr. President, the Human
Services Committee reports a favorable
recommendation on Senate Bill 111 with
amendments on pages 7, 8, 9, 13, and 13.
Respectfully, Charles Stewart, Acting
Committee Chair."
Move we adopt the Committee Report.

Mr. President:

Motion to adopt the Committee Report.
those in favor say "aye."

All

Body:

Aye.

Mr. President:

Are there any opposed?

Body:

(None)

Mr. President:

Seeing no opposition, the bill is before us,
Senate Bill 111. Senator Hillyard.

Sen. Hillyard:

Thank you, Mr. President. I want to direct
the Senate's attention to the fact that this
is probably going to be one of the most
important pieces of legislation that we
consider this session as it relates to crime,
and it's a part of a package. It's not the
sole crime package, but it's part of it.
The body may also remember a year ago, I
filed the bill under the same name, quite a
bit different from this bill. It was Senate
Bill 249. We had a very interesting debate
in which I had opposition from a number of
people in law enforcement because I felt that
it was doing the proper thing to give more
power to the juvenile court judges to address
the serious problems of gang and youth
violence.

This body chose to adopt and pass that bill
unanimously. We realized in passing it, it
carried a significant fiscal note, but we
also knew that it would be giving a message
that we wanted something done in this area.
And I can report back-- since that action in
the past year, there has been a tremendous
amount of work by all the various agencies to
have come together to biring to you Senate
Bill 111, which is a serious youth offender
bill.
This bill is being supported by a number of
people including the Governor, the Commission
on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, Utah
Sentencing Commission, Utah Substance Abuse
and Anti-violence Council, Utah Judicial
Council, juvenile court judges (and I should
indicate that the juvenile court judges have
felt left out in the process, now feel very
much a part of this process in coming to
grips with this), Board of Youth Corrections,
Utah Law Enforcement Legislative Committee,
and many, many others.
Let me just indicate that the bill does three
things. Number one, it provides that if a
youth 16 or 17 years old is charged with
aggravated murder or murder, which was
formerly called first or second degree
murder, if they're charged with this, they
will be automatically transferred and treated
in the adult system.
One of the issues now pending before the Utah
Supreme Court involves a young man here in
Salt Lake City who shot and killed another
person, I think at the Triad Center. The
case up on appeal is whether our current
system is legal, where you can be certified
or directly filed at the discretion of the
prosecutor. The issue is whether, how much
discretion the prosecutor can have. And this
bill takes away from that, and if the
prosecutor chooses to charge as first or
second degree murder, aggravated or murder,
the young man or young woman is automatically
treated in the adult system.
The second place where it automatically goes
is if that youth has been committed to a
secure facility. They use the term committed
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in juvenile court. We would talk about
confinement in a jail. But the committed,
and then commits a felony, which is another
serious offense, then they automatically are
placed in the adult system. The reason being
is the feeling is that if you have been
committed in the juvenile court system, that
is the most severe punishment they can give
to you. And if that hasn't worked, the
feeling is that you now completed the, what
is available in the juvenile court system,
and you will now, as the saying goes, if you
commit an adult crime, you'll spend adult
time.
The third issue this case creates, and a
thing that I really like about it, is that it
lists a number of very serious aggravated
offenses such as aggravated arson, aggravated
assault, aggravated kidnapping, etc. If that
is committed by a youth 16 or 17 years of
age, then there's a process set up whereby he
is certified over to district court but can
be retained by the juvenile court. So the
juvenile court will have a chance to hear
that in a preliminary hearing type situation
and be able to make a decision that, no,
there are programs for this youth that would
still make him amenable to what can be done
in juvenile court and he would be retained.
It does away with the direct filing so the
court, the prosecutor will not be able to
directly file any more, but will go through a
preliminary hearing process in front of the
juvenile court for those youth under the age
of 16. At our committee hearing, we had an
argument by the ACLU that this violated
constitutional rights. I'm reminded of a
statement my good friend Senator Chic Bullen
said, if you get four lawyers together
arguing what is due process, you'll get six
different opinions. But I can assure you
that this bill has been examined very
carefully by lawyers on that issue of due
process and feel satisfied that it does
satisfy the due process requirement.
Another question came up in committee whether
we ought to lower that age from 16 to 15.
The 16 age was taken because there are a
number of factors that occur at 16, but also
3

in looking at the implementation of this
bill, the current data would show that there
are probably going to be between 50 and 75
youth that will be impacted by that that have
just been in place. To lower that age, we
may come back and want to do that. But this
time, as we move forward, we think the
appropriate age is 16 and that's the line
that we want to draw.
Again, the message, we hope, and it's a
tragic part of our society, that there's
going to be youth who are going to end up in
the state prison because of their actions.
But the feeling is that there is mechanisms
within the adult system that if they really
don't warramt going to state prison, they can
be protected; but, on the other hand, many of
these youths or most of these youths will end
up in prison anyway, and we may as well get
them down there and protect society during
that time period.
This bill has been included in the Governor's
budget for funding, has a fiscal note
obviously with it. But as I've indicated to
the committee and I'll indicate to you, it's
only a part of the Governor's program. The
other very important part is to address the
things that we need to do in prevention.
Some of the programs in public education the
Governor's already led into to do and that
we've done, I think, will impact what we're
doing. Also, I think this gives a signal
that will be helpful in the areas of
prevention. And the other part of the parcel
will be, sadly enough, construction of more
prison space or making available. Some of
these youths, quite frankly, are a severe
danger not only to themselves but to society
and should be removed from the streets.
Mr. President, that is a synopsis of Senate
Bill 111. Again, has wide and broad base
support. I think it is an important step for
this Legislature to take.
Mr. President:

Thank you.

Senator Hull.

Sen. Hull:

Thank you. I was in the committee when this
was heard, and I do have some concern. I am
supportive of this bill. My concern is the
age at which they can be certified for the
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district court, which is 16.
discussed.

And it's been

Sen. Hillyard:

They can certify below the age of 16.

Sen. Hull:

That is correct.

Sen. Hillyard:

It's automatic at 16.

Sen. Hull:

It is automatic at 16. And my concern, and
I've asked this question on several of the
bills that have come up dealing with juvenile
justice, why they selected 16, and it's kind
of a random age, and I've received several
answers. One that, I guess the best answer
was that's the age you get a license so
you're more accountable. But there will be
other bills coming through, and I think I
will make, try to make an amendment to make
that lower, and another one dealing with
confidentiality. But I'm wondering, really
in our society where these kids are in
schools, it's drilled into their minds that
at age Ninth Grade that, as least as far as
their academic behaviors are concerned, those
go in to stone, those credits and all their
behaviors and that are kept on school records
for public use for the rest of their lives,
from Ninth Grade on. And I'm wondering, if
we ought to not, since that is already
embedded in their minds that they should be
accountable then, the colleges use the Ninth,
Tenth and Eleventh Grades for their
accountabilities, if not that is the age
where they ought to be taught in the courts
to be accountable, too. That's my only
concern. I am for, supportive of this bill
as is.

Sen. Hillyard:

I appreciate Senator Hull raising that issue.
And in response to it, in talking to Camille
Anthony, who is the director of CCDJ, her
comment was again, in checking back over,
they wanted to keep it at age 16 to see how
the thing works out. And if it turns out,
Senator Hull, I would be more than happy to
have you sponsor the bill to lower the age.

Mr. President:

Senator Howell.

Sen. Howell:

Thank you, Mr. President. Maybe we can just
make a little amendment here to do that
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little friendly amendment, Camille.
would that be?

How

Sen. Hillyard:

To faint.
age.

Sen. Howell

Senator Hillyard, as you know, I had the bill
with regards to concealed weapons and minors,
and that was one that I was very concerned
about because on a daily basis, we see, not
on a daily basis but quite often, we see
young people who are carrying concealed
weapons walking up and down Main Street and
so on and so forth. How would that, how
would your bill deal with those offenders?

Sen. Hillyard:

We clarify a conflict in the law currently.
There's a conflict in the law because
prosecutors can tell you that they can
directly file on anyone directly in an adult
court.

Sen. Howell:

Right.

Sen. Hillyard:

That's what they did in the case of the West
High student.

Sen. Howell:

Right.

Sen. Hillyard:

The juvenile court judges will tell you, in
reading the law, they can't do that and they
can bring them back. Now we resolve that
issue. They can no longer directly file.
What's going to happen, if you're 16 or
older, one of these crimes, then you'll go
directly to an adult system. If you're under
age 16, you will then file in juvenile court
but request the juvenile court certify the
youth over. So you could have a 14 year old
who could be, in fact, certified over and
treated as an adult, but the juvenile court
would have a preliminary hearing to decide
whether that transfer ought to be made.

Sen. Howell:

So the juvenile justice then would make the
recommendation to bind them over as an adult?

Sen. Hillyard:

That's correct.

Sen. Howell:

Okay. Are we confident, and I guess this
gets back to the age factor, are we confident
that in those cases that they'll do it? Like

No.
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I would resist changing the

when there's a 14 year old who has been
involved in a felony, let's say? I mean, how
do I get warm fuzzies that they're going to
make this decision about turning them over?
I mean, that's my concern, is that kid,
individual, who sees no future but they're
willing to shoot someone.
Sen. Hillyard:

Well, let me tell you the problem we had last
year and what got the opposition to my bill
was the frustration of juvenile court judges
that they would get a young man or young
woman and say, "You're going to spend eight
months in a secure facility," walk out of the
court, and youth correction would say, "We
don't have the room for you, you're out of
here." It was a joke. And so what we've
really done is now given the juvenile court
more play in what they're going to do.

Sen. Howell:

Okay. And that, that's the very situation is
to say, "We're filled up, sorry you've
committed this terrible heinous crime, but we
can't take any more." So I think that, if
what you're saying is now they have an
alternative to say, "You're certified as an
adult," or, a 16 year old, "You're out of
here." Great!

Sen. Hillyard:

And that's correct. And that's part of the
package. I mean, to do this bill alone
without the prevention, without more bed
space, would be a mockery to the system and,
I think, a fraud on the people of the state
of Utah. We're doing all three of them.

Sen. Howell:

Mr. President, I withdrew my senate bill with
regards to juveniles and possession of guns
for this very reason. And this satisfies all
the requirements that I had in that bill, so
I commend Senator Hillyard for doing a great
job on this.

Mr. President

Thank you, Senator Howell. Senator Hillyard.
Are there any further questions of Senator
Hillyard? Senator Hillyard, would you like
to sum up. Oh, excuse me, Senator
McAllister.

Sen. McAllister:

Senator Hillyard, I have a concern with
regard to the fiscal note that's on page 21.
And you show there the first full year costs.
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Now those figures, now if I understand
correctly, you expect that there would be 2
murders within that first full year, 15 first
degree, and so on, is that correct?
Sen. Hillyard:

I'd have to, I'd have to go to Camille, who
has put this in.

Sen. McAllister:

Is that a proper assumption?

Sen. Hillyard:

Yes.

Sen. McAllister:

Well, the concern I have then, if you look 10
years from now, you're expecting 9 times more
murders, over 10, probably 12 times more
first degree, probably 3-1/2 times more
felonies, and so on. Do you really feel that
in 10 years, we're going to be living in an
environment, in a society where such crimes,
or is it just population? I'm really
overwhelmed with that kind of statistics.

Sen. Hillyard:

I understand. It's a cumulative buildup type
thing in the system. But, again, I can have
somebody address that fiscal note directly if
you want. But my understanding is, is that
the 18 reflects a buildup of over those time
periods.

Sen. McAllister:

I see then. It says 10th year, and there's
nothing to indicate accumulative on that.
Are you saying then that the fiscal note for
the first year would be $1,338,000, but
because we're dealing with a part of a year,
it's $351,800?

Sen. Hillyard:

That's correct.

Sen. McAllister:

But in the 10th year, we're not looking at
$8,000,000 in that year alone (but that's in
a sense what it says), but you're saying,
then if the first year is $1,338,000, it
ought to be something like 10 times that in
the 10th year, and it isn't.

Sen. Hillyard:

I would have to have Leo, who prepared the
fiscal note, as you know, he doesn't go just
directly on what somebody tells him, he put
some things together. I'd be glad to answer
it on the third reading.

Sen. McAllister:

I think that's fine, but I'd like an answer
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on that, if you would, please, on the third.
Sen. Hillyard:

I'll get that information.

Mr. President:

Any further questions of Senator Hillyard?
Mr. President.

Sen. Hillyard:

Mr. President, before I sum up, personal
privilege, I have an unrelated matter.

Mr. President, in summation, I think that
we've pointed out very well this is a bill
that's been worked on very hard by a number
of people. I am fortunate enough to be just
merely a spokesman to represent hundreds of
hours that have been put on this problem. We
realize this is not going to solve the
problem, it's a combination of other things
that need to be put together. But I think
it's an excellent beginning, and I would urge
the support of this body, and I'd call for a
question on the bill.
Mr. President;

Thank you, Senator Hillyard.

HOUSE DEBATE
51ST LEGISLATURE
GENERAL SESSION
DAY 45--MARCH 1, 1995
TAPE 1 AT 54 52
Reading Clerk:

Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by
Lyle W. Hillyard. Committee vote: 9 yes,
0 no, 3 absent.

Mr. Speaker:

Representative Fox.

Rep. Fox:

Yes, thank you, Mr. Speaker. Before I begin,
1 would like to move the amendments that have
been passed out under my name for Senate
Bill 111. Perhaps we ought to check and make
sure the body has those. Just been passed
out, just recently.
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Mr. Speaker:

Those who do not
Senate Bill 111,
see. The circle
circle and go on

Rep. Fox:

That will be just fine while the
pages . . . .

Mr. Speaker:

I have a motion to circle Senate Bill 111.
Discussion that motion. Saying that, all in
favor say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries. The bill is circled.
Madam Reading Clerk.

Rep. Fox:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would move that we
uncircle Senate Bill 111.

Mr. Speaker:

We have a motion to remove the circle from
Senate Bill 111. Would you state the title.

Rep. Fox:

Yes, Serious Youth Offender.

Mr. Speaker:

Discussion of the motion to uncircle.
none, all in favor say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries,
You may proceed.

Rep. Fox:

Yes, thank you. I think everyone now has the
amendments that were just passed out. I
would like to move those amendments on page
19, line 21 and after 1, delete "proceedings"
and insert " except as provided in section
78-3a-25 and 78-3a-25.1 proceedings" and page
19, line 29, after "violations" insert
"criminal proceedings under section 78-3a-25
and 78-3a-25.1 or to establish the
10

have the amendments of
raise your hand so we can
does not, maybe we ought to
for a minute.

Seeing

The bill is uncircled.

jurisdiction of the court under section 783a-16(l)." Now, what that does is currently
our code states that juvenile court evidence
may not be used any place else other than the
juvenile court. To effect the provisions of
SB111, Serious Youth Offender, we need to
exempt the crimes commitced that would fall
under this bill. So we wanted to, we have to
make that exemption in the current code.
Mr. Speaker;

The motion is that we accept the pink sheet
amendment under Representative Fox's name
dated February 23, 1995 at 5:08 p.m.
Discussion of the motion to amend. Seeing
none, all those in favor of the motion to
amend say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries,
You may proceed.

Rep. Fox:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Unfortunately, Utah
has seen a tremendous expansion of our young
people who are committing serious crimes-murder, all sorts of drive-by shootings. We
see all these things happening. Frankly,
we're at a loss to how to deal with these
young criminals. They are still under age,
but they are hardened criminals nonetheless.

The bill is amended.

The serious youth offender bill is the
product of a year-long effort from Utah's
criminal and juvenile justice professionals
to create a new category of crime that will
safeguard the public and hold violent and
chronic juvenile offenders accountable. What
it does is it makes it so the district court
has exclusive original jurisdiction over
juveniles age 16 and older charged with
aggravated murder, murder and any felony
committed subsequent to confinement in the
most secure youth offender facilities.
Juveniles age 16 years and older who commit
one of the other ten serious offenses against
a person will be charged with adult crimes.
The preliminary hearing is held in the
juvenile court. If the juvenile court judge
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finds probable cause, the burden will shift
to the defendant to show that he or she
should remain in the juvenile court. And
unless the defendant fits some stringent
criteria, he or she will go directly to trial
as an adult in the district court. Juveniles
who do not meet the serious youth offender
criteria may still be tried as adults in
district court under the current
certification process. For consistency,
those cases will also have preliminary
hearings in the juvenile court. I am glad to
answer questions.
Mr. Speaker:

Representative Bresnahan.

Rep. Bresnahan:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
yield?

Rep. Fox:

Yes.

Rep. Bresnahan:

I have a question regarding the section
beginning on page 6 and 7 regarding a felony
committed by a juvenile age 14 or older. And
if you wouldn't mind, I'd like to understand
the difference between what was said earlier
in the bill about 16 and older and this
section regarding 14 and older.

Rep. Fox:

Under current law, the burden of proof is on
the State to show why they shouldn't. This
new change, it would shift that burden to the
defendant to prove why they should be judged
as a juvenile.

Rep. Bresnahan:

So, this--

Rep. Fox:

As an adult, I'm sorry.

Rep. Bresnahan:

This makes it easier for us to certify some
of these offenders as adults? Is that my
understanding? Is that correct?

Rep. Fox:

Yes.

Rep. Bresnahan:

That's the only question I have. I'd like to
say that I do support this bill very
heartily. It is needed. I have been, I've
taken the time to tour our juvenile
facilities. I've gone through every step of
the way that a juvenile could go through
those facilities at all the different levels.
12

Will the sponsor

And I've had opportunity not only to
interview the staff at those facilities but
many of the juveniles involved there as well
as some of their parents. It is quite clear
to me that we are dealing with a large
portion of the juvenile population who are
not only violent offenders but they are
repeat violent offenders.
And after having an opportunity to first-hand
see them and to gain some understanding of
their circumstances and the various things
that are happening in their lives, I think
the greatest service that we can do for them
is to intercede as early as possible in the
chain of events that lead them down a lifelong road of violence and constantly
requiring incarceration by our society.
Hopefully, by taking action early, by being
strong early and getting tough early, we're
going to prevent the continual repeat
offenses that seem to take place over and
over again, where we're hearing stories
almost daily of youths that have been through
this system time and time again, go back out
into society, and continue to cause greater
harm and greater injury to others, create
more crime. And not only do they do get
involved in it, but they're bringing others
along with them. I believe that the only way
that we're going to be able to see a decrease
is to get tougher, particularly on the youth
offenders, and I think this is an excellent,
excellent bill and it's worthy of all our
support. Thank you.
Mr. Speaker:

Representative Barth.

Rep. Barth:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Let me start off by
saying this is a good bill. There's a lot of
thought and energy that have gone into this
bill. This bill is a couple of things,
though. It's not a cure-all. Anybody who
thinks that this bill is going to take all of
these serious youth offenders off the streets
and we're going to be rid of that problem is
mistaken, but it goes a long ways in doing
that. It's not the last step in fixing a
system that is antiquated that we need to
take, but it is a significant and important
step. This is going to take some kids off
the street and put them into the adult system
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faster than if we don't pass this bill. This
bill will get them off the streets two years
earlier.
We're talking about 16 year olds that are
going to get to the adult system eventually,
They're conti nuing their behavior. They've
had their one shot at the juvenile system.
They're going to get into the adult system.
We need to be mindful of a couple things,
though. The kid needs a one-stop good shot
at the juveni le system and the resources that
are there.
Some people have said the average stay for a
juvenile in the juvenile facility is eight
months. That's true. But you're lumping in
there children that have been in there for
years, putting that into the average, take
the top 10% out and the bottom 10% out; the
average stay is about three months. That's a
beds problem. This addresses a different
problem, and we need to address that beds
problem as well, and we are in this
Legislature to some degree.
We're not throwing kids away after this. The
kids have had a one-shot at the juvenile
system, and we need to start getting tough
with them. We need to let them know that
their behavior is unacceptable, and they need
to change if they're going to be allowed out
in society. I would urge you to vote for
this bill heartily, but do it mindfully that
this is not the last step in fixing the
juvenile justice problem that we've got in
the state of Utah. This is not going to
decrease gangs sufficiently that we can stop,
rest on our laurels and quit. But it is a
significant and worthwhile first step.
Johnson.

Mr. Speaker:

Representative M_

Rep. Johnson:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker,
question, please.

Mr. Speaker:

Previous question has been called. All in
favor of the previous question say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."
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I move previous

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries.
summation.

Rep. Fox:

I think it's all been said. I urge your
support. Please vote for the bill.
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Back to sponsor for

ADDENDUM E

UTAH STATE SENATE
FIFTY FOURTH LEGISLATURE
2002 GENERAL SESSION
JANUARY 22. 2002

DAY 2. TAPE 4

CLERK: Senate Bill 26, Senator Hillyard.
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE: Senator Hillyard, ready to proceed.
SENATOR HILLYARD: One of the advantages of being here for awhile is you pass a bill
and you get to come back here the next year and make two amendments to it, and then you
come back and make four amendments and you end up doing a lot of bills but they all result
from the work you did on one.
I don't know how much background I want to give you on the Serious Youth Offender. I
won't give you a lot but I think you need to know why we're doing what we're doing. The
Serious Youth Offender was an action we took several years ago with a deep concern about
some of the youths who were 16 and 17 years old who would normally be so out of control
that the juvenile court system would have no impact on them whatsoever. We had to have
a mechanism whereby we could move them into the adult system where the emphasis is more
on safety and less on rehabilitation because of the limited dollars we have in the juvenile
court system in which the primary emphasis is on rehabilitation. This bill does two things.
It actually started out at your request that I combine it in two bills.
The first part of the bill; under our current law if a juvenile has been in secure confinement
and then gets out of secure confinement and does something again very serious - zip - they
go right into the adult system, there's no question about it. Well the problem we found, law
of unintended consequences, was that these kids talk, and they say "you know, if I get out of
Decker Lake and I get out in one of these secure places and I assault a guard, then I get
moved automatically into the adult system even though I have not really served my time
there, I'm just there right now, have been placed there. And in the adult system I can bail
out, I can do those things and get out free and so it really is," so they think, "an advantage."
That's not really the case. We've got some things, but what we do with this bill is simply say
that if you do that assault while you're at the center it doesn't automatically put you over to
the adult system. And so that's the first amendment. Youth Corrections have come forward
to us and said we need to make this amendment because there seems to be some incentive
on these kids to do an assault because they could move over to the adult system.
The second part of it was, there was a Supreme Court case that came down on this issue that
one of these youths again met the criteria, was transferred over because he was charged w ith
a very serious felony. When the case concluded, the jury, or the judge, in this case the adult

system, didn't find him guilty of that felony but found him guilty of a misdemeanor. Now
the question's got to be , "What do we do with him now?" because he was automatically
certified over because he was charged with this felony but in fact we found him guilty of a
misdemeanor. Now it's interesting to read the decision of the court because what they did,
they sent him back to juvenile court and they said, "We don't know the answer, but we're
sure if we're wrong the legislature will tell us." Well we're here to tell them that they were
wrong. We made the decision when we did the Serious Youth Offender that if someone does
something that serious, they've had that kind of background and that kind of help, the
decision we made is that the rehabilitative thrust of juvenile court should no longer be
available to them. They ought to move into the adult system with the emphasis on public
safety. So what this bill says is, if that happens again, because we've made the decision to
move them over to the adult system, they'll stay in the adult system and be treated for the
conviction of the misdemeanor as though they had been an adult and convicted of the same
misdemeanor and treated there. That's what the bill does. It was approved unanimously by
the interim committee. Again I think it answers a question the Supreme Court asked us the
answer. I think we're just keeping in policy what we've decided before.
PRESIDENT: OK. Any questions for Senator Hillyard on this bill? (silence) Being none,
I'll call for question on the bill.
Question is: Shall Senate Bill 26 be read for the third time? Roll call vote.
(Roll call)

JANUARY 23. 2002

DAY 3, TAPE 5

PRESIDENT: We will now go to Senate Bill 26
CLERK: Senate Bill 26, Serious Youth Offender Amendment, Senator Hillyard.
PRESIDENT: Senator Hillyard?
SENATOR HILLYARD: I explained this bill yesterday. It basically clarifies two issues with
Serious Youth Offenders:
Number one, if they're in a secured facility and attack a guard, they are not automatically
transferred over to the adult system.
Number two, if they get transferred over to the adult system and then for some reason they're
found not guilty of the felony but of the misdemeanor, they still remain in the adult system.
Once the juvenile system has expended its patience, programs and time on someone so they
now get transferred over to the adult system, that's where they stay.
No questions yesterday and it passed unanimously.
PRESIDENT: Any other questions of Senator Hillyard on this today? (silence) Very good.
I will now call for question on the bill.
Question is: Shall Senate Bill 26 be read for the third time, up for final passage? Roll call
vote.
(Roll Call)

HOLSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FIFTY FOURTH LEGISLATURE
JANUARY 30. 2002
DAY 1Q.T\PE 1
(Representative Swallow, Senate Bill 26 Pass. 69 yes, 0 no )
REPRESENTATIVE SWALLOW- Thank you Mr Speaker. Motion to uncircle Senate Bill
26, Senous Youth Offender Amendments.
MR. SPEAKER: Motion is that we uncircle Senate Bill 26, Senous Youth Offender
Amendments. Discussion of motion? Seeing none, all in favor say aye.
REPRESENTATIVES: Aye.
MR. SPEAKER: Opposed say no. Motion passes. Senate Bill 26 will be uncircled
Representative Swallow?
REP. SWALLOW: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Representatives, this bill makes two changes
to the Senous Youth Offender statutes which permits certain juveniles to be tned in the
distnct court.
The first change deals with when a senous youth is referred to the distnct court, under the
laws it currently constituted once a youth has been assigned to a secured facility, if that
youth thereafter commits a felony, then they become subject to the junsdiction of the distnct
court. Practically speaking what has happened is therefore a youth has committed a cnme,
been sentenced to a secured facility and then has intentionally committed a felony while in
custody to be able to go to the adult system and take advantage of some of the parole issues
in the adult system and get an early release. So what this bill does first of all is it states that
if that felony is committed while they're in custody in the juvenile system that does not
automatically throw them into the adult system which I think is a wise policy
The second change deals with the fact that when a juvenile is charged with a certain type of
cnme they are automatically taken to the distnct court to be tned as an adult Later on a
question anses that if they're not convicted of that cnme but they actually are convicted of
a lesser cnme, who has junsdiction, the adult court (the distnct court) or the juvenile court7
This bill clanfies that if they are charged w ith that adult cnme and convicted of a lesser cnme
that distnct court still retains junsdiction over the juvenile and that avoids the conflict
between junsdiction. With that I'm open to any questions on the bill
MR SPEAKER Further discussion of Senate Bill 26 9 Seeing none, Representative Swallow
for summation.

REPRESENTATIVE SWALLOW: I'll waive summation.
MR. SPEAKER: Summation is waived. Voting is open on Senate Bill 26.
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(Note on tape says "Hillyard motion call of Senate
pass lift call pass motion to concur")
PRESIDENT: Well lets go to the concurrent calendar, and we'll go to Senate Bill 26.
CLERK: Senate Bill 26 is Serious Youth Offender amendment, Senator Hillyard.
PRESIDENT: Alright. Senator Hillyard?
SENATOR HILLYARD: I have a concern in handling the bill right now because the
amendment was put in at my request. This is the Serious Youth Offender bill. Youth
Corrections came to me and said could you please get this effective immediately because of
the problems we're having with some of the cases of being referred back at district court.
We are reversing a Utah court case that said "we don't know what the answer is but we're
going to guess and if we're wrong the legislature will correct us." So we said, "you guessed
wrong, we're correcting you." But I need to have 20 votes and so I'm looking to make sure
I have. It passed unanimously here and it passed in the House. The concurrence is that
we've inserted language making it effective immediately upon two thirds votes and signed
by the Governor.
PRESIDENT: Do you want a call of the Senate?
SENATOR HILLYARD: I'll do a call of the Senate. If I can speak with the Senate to help
me on that issue because I need to have . . .
PRESIDENT: Do we have five senators standing? (silence)
We're the call of Senate.
SENATOR HILLYARD: Thank you.

